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ABSTRACT 
 
Prostitution is a morally loaded word. More than just sex for money, it implies 
something  debased,  dishonourable,  corrupt.  But  there  is  something  puzzling 
about  the  wrong,  if  any,  of  prostitution.  Intuition  suggests  there  is  something 
peculiar  about  sex  that  distinguishes  prostitution  from  other  bodily  services. 
However,  if  we  discount  out-dated  prejudice  about  promiscuity,  it  remains 
mysterious why adding money to sex should change the permissibility of the act. 
The current debate broadly falls into three camps: 1) Qualms about prostitution 
are based on mere social prejudice about sex; 2) Sex has a special value which is 
debased  or  degraded  when  exchanged  for  money;  3)  Prostitution  perpetuates 
skewed power relations that feed into wider gender inequalities. Too often these 
stances respectively ignore relevant points of disanalogy between sex and other 
bodily activities; rely on undefended essentialist views about the value of sex and 
how it is debased or destroyed; or focus too heavily on contingent empirical and 
sociological evidence, without analysing the nature of the activity itself. This thesis 
takes a step back, analysing the nature of sex and money to identify what sets 
prostitution  apart  from  other  bodily  services.  I  suggest  prostitution  blurs  the 
boundaries between a personal service and an exchange of the body as property. 
This raises the question to what extent individuals can willingly surrender powers 
over their body to others, as one might do with a piece of property. Should a 
liberal state allow individuals to freely transact with their bodies in this way or 
not?  Closer  examination  of  these  puzzles  serves  to  shed  light  on  the  tension 
inherent in prostitution and helps to clarify key notions in the debate, including 
the  concept  of  sexual  autonomy,  the  objectification  and  commodification  of 
bodies, and the relevance of the particular risk of harm inherent in the activity.   6 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Prostitution is a morally loaded word. More than just sex for money, it implies 
something  debased,  dishonourable,  corrupt.  Tellingly,  the  OED  categorizes 
prostitution  as  follows  in  its  thesaurus:  society  >  morality  >  moral  evil  > 
licentiousness > unchastity > prostitution1. And yet, there is something puzzling 
about the wrong, if any, of prostitution. On the one hand, our intuitions incline us 
to think that there is something peculiar about prostitution that marks it apart 
from  other  bodily  services,  and  gives  us  reservations  about  advocating  it  as  a 
career choice as worthy as any other. However, if we discount out-dated prejudice 
about the evil of promiscuity in general, it remains mysterious why and how the 
addition of money to sex could change the permissibility of the act.  
 
The current debate around prostitution broadly falls into three camps: 1) 
Qualms about the wrong of prostitution are based on social prejudice about sex, 
and there really is no principled distinction between prostitution and other bodily 
services2; 2) There is something special and important about the value of sex itself 
which is debased or degraded when sex is exchanged for money3; 3) Prostitution 
perpetuates skewed power relations in sex that feed into wider gender inequalities, 
including harm, exploitation, and the subordination of women4. The key concepts 
in  this  battleground  are  the  familiar  ones  about  the  objectification  and 
commodification  of  women’s  bodies,  the  undermining  of  women’s  sexual 
autonomy, and the direct and indirect harm caused by markets in sex. Too often, 
though, arguments are built on assumptions which breeze over some of the most 
relevant philosophical questions. Stance 1) tends to dismiss social prejudice about 
sex too quickly, likening it to historical prejudice around other bodily activities like 
acting, without examining closely enough the points of disanalogy between the 
                                                 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary Historical Thesaurus: 
http://www.oed.com/view/th/class/179941 (retrieved 30/08/2014) 
2 E.g. Nussbaum (1998) 
3 E.g. Anderson (1990) 
4 E.g. Pateman (1988), Satz (2010)   10 
two. Conversely, stance 2) tends to rely too heavily on essentialist views about the 
value  of  sex,  and  controversial  implicit  assumptions  about  the  ways  in  which 
values are debased or destroyed. Stance 3), meanwhile, tends to fall into the trap 
of either implicitly relying on essentialist views that it ostensibly rejects, or simply 
telling us something perhaps sociologically important about markets in sex and 
their  contingent  empirical  effects  on  society,  but  not  anything  particularly 
philosophical about the nature of the activity itself.  
 
It is my intention with this thesis to take a step further back, to analyse the 
nature of prostitution itself, and to begin with some fundamental questions the 
answers to which are too often assumed or overlooked, but which provide an 
insight  into  just  why  this  activity  remains  a  point  of  moral  and  political 
controversy  even  within  a  politically  liberal  context.  I  suggest  that  there  is 
something about the nature of sex and the social meaning attached to money that 
sets prostitution apart from other commercial bodily activities in a way that is at 
least  potentially  problematic.  As  a  commercial  transaction,  there  is  an 
indeterminacy as to whether prostitution is characterised as a personal service or 
as a transaction in which powers over the body are exchanged as though it were a 
piece of property. This prompts an investigation into the kind of ownership we 
have over our own bodies and the ways in which we can transfer this ownership 
power  to  others.  I  suggest  that  the  notions  of  bodily  ownership  and  property 
ownership stem from a fundamental concern that individuals be able to exercise 
their autonomy by acting freely in a world shared with others. As such, there are 
points of overlap between the kinds of ownership claims we have over our bodies 
and  the  ownership  claims  we  can  have  over  property.  However,  there  is  a 
fundamental difference between the two where it comes to the alienation of these 
ownership  claims.  Furthermore,  a  closer  analysis  of  this  difference  and  the 
political  justification  for  recognising  this  in  law,  brings  us  to  a  better 
understanding of the relevant notions of autonomy at play in debates about the 
extent to which individuals may willingly surrender power over their bodies to 
others.    11 
 
I suggest that in inhabiting a grey area between the domains of bodily rights 
and property rights in the way that it treats the body, prostitution by its very 
nature presents several puzzles that pull liberal principles in opposite directions. It 
is  this  feature  of  prostitution  that  at  once  renders  it  morally  and  politically 
problematic and makes it notoriously difficult – perhaps impossible – to pin down 
the wrong of prostitution. Closer examination of these puzzles, however, should 
serve to shed some greater light on the tension inherent in prostitution as well as 
helping to clarify some of the key notions at play in the debate, including the 
concept of sexual autonomy, the objectification and commodification of bodies, 
and the relevance of the particular risk of harm inherent in the activity. 
     12 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
AN INDETERMINACY PROBLEM FOR PROSTITUTION 
 
This chapter analyses the various elements of sex and prostitution with the aim of 
pinpointing which aspects of the activity present as problematic, and why. I begin 
by considering how the addition of money to certain interactions can change the 
terrain  of  moral  permissibility  for  behaviour  within  those  interactions,  and 
suggesting that there may be certain activities like sex for which this changes the 
permissibility of the commercial interaction as a whole. This prompts an analysis 
of how adding money to sex characterises the interaction of prostitution, and what 
implications this has for the way in which the transaction is carried out. I then 
suggest  that  given  the  wider  meaning  of  money,  prostitution  is  open  to  being 
characterised in two ways, either on the model of a property transaction in which 
the client gains powers over the sex workers body as though it were a piece of 
property,  or  as  a  personal  service  carried  out  like  any  other  bodily  service.  I 
suggest that these two characterisations are plausible both within the context of 
the  wider  debate  around  prostitution,  and  that  there  is  something  about  the 
nature of sex itself that leaves it particularly open to both these interpretations 
when  subjected  to  a  monetary  transaction.    Finally,  I  suggest  that  this 
indeterminacy presents a problem insofar as it challenges us to consider the kind 
of ownership we have over our bodies and the ways in which this both overlaps 
with and diverges from the kind of ownership we can have over other objects.  
 
 
I. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES MONEY MAKE? 
 
IF consensual sex raises no particular worries until conducted for payment, then if 
we want to understand the source of the problematic of prostitution, we ought to 
begin by asking what difference money makes. It seems that often, the terrain of 
moral  permissibility  can  be  shaped  by  the  social  and  legal  framework  within   13 
which people interact. By this I do not mean simply that if the law prohibits a 
certain activity, and there is a moral imperative to obey the law, then engaging in 
that illegal activity would be morally as well as legally impermissible. Rather, I 
mean that where social institutions create a framework of expectations and norms 
for social interactions, these can affect the moral status of certain acts carried out 
within that framework. It can do this by affecting the meaning attached to certain 
actions and interactions with other people, and by setting expectations about what 
we owe to one another within certain socially acknowledged roles.  
 
A simple example of how social institutions can shape moral permissibility 
in this way is the unwritten code of table manners. Table manners set rules for 
how to act in given social settings, and determine certain roles, with expectations 
for how people interact given their particular role in a given setting. A guest at a 
dinner party, for instance, is expected to show gratitude towards the host for his 
efforts  at  hospitality.  For  the  guest  to  embark  on  a  detailed  critique  of  any 
shortcomings  of  the  food  served  would  be  considered  inappropriate  and  rude 
behaviour, even if the host were out of earshot at the time. However, shift the 
context to one in which the diner has paid the host to cook him a meal, and we 
might think the guest fully entitled to voice his opinions honestly. The normative 
bounds of acceptable behaviour shift when the roles of the participants change 
from invited guest and host to paying-guest and paid-host. Part of the reason why 
is that the expectations about how each person may behave in respect of the other 
change depending on the socially acknowledged roles assigned within the given 
context. Money can make this kind of difference.   
 
There is a further question, however, how such shifting of behavioural 
norms could change the permissibility of the interaction as a whole. Indeed, there 
are  very  many  activities  that  can  be  carried  out  either  commercially  or  non-
commercially,  and  we  understand  that  the  character  of  the  commercial 
transactions is different from the non-commercial ones, but not in a way that is 
problematic. If there is a difference between sex and these other activities, such   14 
that exchanging money for sex becomes morally problematic, then the reason 
must be that the way in which money changes the expected patterns of interaction 
between  the  roles  of  client  and  worker  in  sex  creates  patterns  of  expected 
behaviour that are morally problematic or impermissible.  
 
This gives us an indication of where to begin our analysis of prostitution. 
We will want to see how engaging in sex within the context of a commercial 
interaction might affect the terrain of moral permissibility for this activity through 
the norms it creates as to what is expected of each party in the interaction. One 
way we might think this changes is as follows. Sex usually happens within the 
context  of  mutual  satisfaction  of  desires,  if  not  always  within  a  loving  and 
respectful relationship. So even in a casual sexual encounter with a stranger, the 
act  is  characterised  by  each  person  having  a  desire  she  wishes  to  satisfy,  and 
engaging with the other person in recognition of a motive on the part of the other 
person to satisfy her own desire through this joint activity. Each might be selfishly 
pursuing her own ends, but doing so by lending her body for use of the other to 
do the same. When a person has sex in exchange for money, however, the mutual 
character  of  the  interaction  becomes  skewed,  with  the  sex  worker  (usually  a 
woman) instead being subordinated to fulfil the desires of the client (usually a 
man) with no regard on either side to the desires of the sex worker. This is driven 
by  the  expectations  of  a  commercial  transaction,  summarised  in  the  popular 
slogan “the customer is king”. According to this account, the mutual interaction 
therefore  becomes  one  in  which  the  client  has  power  over  the  sex  worker  in 
relation to the act, and can demand satisfaction as the paying-guest at the dinner 
table can demand that the food be prepared exactly to his taste, regardless of what 
the  host  would  prefer  to  eat.  Each  party  being  aware  of  this  dynamic,  their 
attitudes towards each other are likely to shift, with the client viewing the sex 
worker as a mere servant to the fulfilment of his desires5.  
                                                 
5 C.f. Pateman (1988) and Anderson (1990). Though Anderson argues on slightly different lines 
that trading sex for money does damage to the value of sex. According to Anderson, sex ought to 
be  characterized  by  the  values  of  gift  and  friendship.  Her  argument  seems  to  work  on  the 
assumption that when sex is traded commercially, people’s attitudes towards sex change in such a 
way as to threaten the value of sex itself, thus making commercial sex morally problematic.    15 
 
According  to  critics  such  as  Carole  Pateman,  this  shift  in  the  power 
balance opens the door to domination, exploitation and harm, and sparks worries 
about the autonomy of the sex worker who is placed in the subordinate position. 
Once these problems come to the fore, proponents of this kind of argument think 
that  the  sex  act  has  shifted  from  something  morally  neutral  to  an  act  that 
problematically  subverts  the  equality  and  autonomy  of  both  sex  workers  and 
women in general, and subjects the vulnerable sex worker to a high risk of harm. 
The suggestion is that the commercial transaction and the nature of the relation it 
creates  between  client  and  sex  worker  thus  make  sex  within  this  context 
problematic.  
 
There are contentious claims in Pateman’s account, but it seems plausible 
that there is something about the wider social and legal meaning of monetary 
transactions that might alter how the parties to a sexual encounter relate to each 
other depending on whether the sex has been paid for or not, and that this could 
make a difference to the moral character of the interaction. Furthermore, the 
suggestion  is  that  this  change  in  attitudes  and  expectations  may  change  the 
behaviour of both parties, making it more likely that some harm will come about 
as a result. The challenge, however, is to explain precisely what goes wrong and 
how, without jumping too quickly to the explanation that harm is simply more 
likely to arise from the interactions that are paid for than those which are not. 
 
This  brief  preliminary  consideration  of  how  the  meaning  and  moral 
significance of acts can change depending on context gives us an indication of 
where to begin the analysis. We’ll want to look not only at how money changes 
the designated roles within a sex act, but more importantly why this happens, and 
what implications this has in terms of the permissibility of these interactions.  
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II. AN INDETERMINACY OF FORM 
 
The first point of analysis is to examine how exchanging money for sex 
characterises the interaction, and how this could significantly change the nature of 
an otherwise unproblematic sexual encounter. If we begin by considering simply 
what it means to pay for something, there are two broad ways in which handing 
over money can gain us access to something when we pay for it: (1) One can 
obtain  rights  of  possession  or  control  over  a  thing,  either  permanently  or 
temporarily, as when one buys or rents an object, or (2) One can engage the 
services of another person by hiring them to perform some action. I will argue in 
this  chapter  that  that  there  is  something  about  the  nature  of  sex  that  makes 
prostitution particularly open to being construed on either of these two meanings. 
Furthermore, I will suggest that in the absence of public legislation to determine 
the nature of the transaction, the context within which it is carried out leaves it 
indeterminate  as  to  which  form  the  transaction  takes,  as  this  will  be  largely 
dependent on the attitudes of the participants to the interaction. I will claim that 
there  is  a  potential  for  prostitution  to  be  undertaken  on  the  first  form  of 
transaction  that  makes  prostitution  at  once  problematic  and  philosophically 
interesting. This is because there is a certain common ground between the way we 
relate to bodies and the way we relate to objects that makes it possible to treat 
bodies as though they are property, and to trade in the use of a body in the same 
way  one  might  trade  in  the  use  of  a  hire  car.  However,  the  assertion  of  an 
individual that she wishes to use her body in this way creates a point of tension for 
liberal principles, and a puzzle that provides no straightforward solutions. 
 
I will first take a closer look at the two different meanings that monetary 
payments can have, and then consider how these apply to the case of prostitution. 
The first, and perhaps most obvious thing that we can do with money is to buy 
something,  where  we  exchange  money  for  goods,  thereby  acquiring  property 
rights over those goods. For current purposes, the most salient model to consider 
is that of private property rights, as opposed to common or collective property   17 
rights.  Private  property  rights  entail  rights  of  exclusivity  and  control  over  the 
object in question, as well as the right to transfer the property to anyone else the 
owner may choose to give or sell it to6.  The second way we can use money is to 
pay somebody to perform a certain service, and this might happen as a one-off 
event or under an on-going employment contract. One crucial difference between 
goods and services is that goods are tangible while services are intangible7. This 
has important implications for the difference in nature between buying services 
and goods. In the service agreement the person paying for the service does not 
gain property rights in the service provider or her labour in the same way one can 
gain property rights in a tangible good. So the client does not gain unilateral 
control over the service provider, who maintains the status of an autonomous 
agent in her own right and retains final control over the services she provides. 
These differences are reflected in contemporary UK law governing the sale of 
goods and services, where one of the key distinguishing features of personal service 
agreements, in contrast to sales of material goods, is that specific performance 
cannot be enforced8. 
 
The reasons behind this distinction between paying for goods and paying 
for services are rooted in a fundamental concern for the autonomous status of 
agents involved in these kinds of contracts, and the extent to which a person can 
legitimately be placed under the power of another person and bound to perform 
certain  things  against  her  will.  As  Margaret  Jane  Radin  points  out,  the  usual 
reason  given  for  precluding  specific  performance  of  such  contracts  is  that  to 
enforce this would smack of slavery9. There is a philosophical back-story here 
which  is  of  particular  interest  in  highlighting  something  about  the  moral 
significance in the distinction between the kinds of claims we can contract to hold 
over property and the claims we can contract to hold over people. Gaining a 
better understanding of this will help to clarify one initial problem that I suggest 
                                                 
6 Waldron (2012) 
7 Narasinham (2012) 
8 Sale of Goods Act 1979; Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
9 Radin (1987)   18 
prostitution presents us with, which is to be found in the way that it blurs the 
distinction between an interaction with another person involving her body, and 
use of her body as an object to be possessed. We find a detailed analysis of this 
distinction in Kant10. 
 
Kant notes that when two people enter into a contract with one another 
(which may be an agreement either to transfer goods or to provide a service), each 
party to the contract gains what he calls a personal right against the other person 
and her will (or promise) to perform a certain duty. So rather than obtaining a 
right over a person or his labour, the contract brings into play something new – 
the promissory agreement – which each party is bound to against the other. This 
is not like holding a property right in a moral person such that each holds an 
exclusive right over the other person’s will against everyone else. So if A agrees to 
sell a horse to B, B gains a right against A that he fulfil his promise of delivering 
the horse within an agreed timeframe upon payment of an agreed price, and this 
Kant calls a personal right. On delivery of the horse, B gains property rights in the 
horse  itself.  Kant  calls  these  property  rights  ‘real’  rights,  which  entail  the 
characteristics  of  exclusivity  of  use  and  transfer  rights  mentioned  above,  and 
which hold against all others. 
 
Kant presents the case of the personal service relation, his example being 
that between a master and servant, as involving the master having a ‘personal 
right in a real manner’ in his servants, thus combining some elements of property 
rights with some elements of personal rights. This is the right of the possession of 
an external thing as of a thing and the use of it as of a person. Crucially, the mode 
of acquisition of such a right is governed neither by arbitrary fact nor by mere 
contract, but by Kant’s notion of the law of the right of humanity in our own 
person, which lies beyond every real and personal right. So for Kant, the servants 
of a household belong to the master of the house as if according to a real (or 
property) right, because if they run away the master may forcibly bring them back 
                                                 
10 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals   19 
under his control by unilateral arbitration. But when it comes to the particular use 
he makes of a servant, the master may never decide this unilaterally as if he were 
her owner, because the servants are brought into his power only by power of 
contract, which must involve two persons gaining a personal right against the 
other’s will to fulfil a certain promise. For Kant, any contract “by which the one 
party foregoes his whole liberty for the advantage of the other, therefore ceases to 
be a person, consequently has no duty to keep a contract, but only acknowledges 
power, is in itself contradictory, that is, null and invalid.”11 So the way in which 
the master wishes to put the servants to use has to be agreed bilaterally between 
the master and servant as equal parties to the contract. 
 
There are certainly details to query in this account, not least Kant’s claim 
that  a  master  has  the  right  to  forcibly  bring  servants  back  into  his  possession 
should they run away – a right he also attributes to husbands over runaway wives. 
If  we  do  not  take  the  concept  of  taking  the  servant  back  into  possession  too 
literally, however, we can understand the thought behind this as explaining the 
way  in  which  a  service  contract  is  binding  despite  the  fact  that  specific 
performance cannot be enforced. We can understand it as follows: the servant, 
having freely bound himself to a promissory agreement to serve the master for a 
certain  time,  is  under  obligation  to  return  to  the  master,  so  the  master  can 
authoritatively  call  him  back  to  be  held  to  account  against  the  terms  of  the 
agreement. It is not made clear what system of compensation or damages would 
be awarded to the master should the servant break the terms of the agreement and 
refuse to return to service at all, but what is clear is that in Kant’s view the master 
would have no unilateral claim to have the servant’s particular service enforced.   
 
The  underlying  conceptual  framework  of  Kant’s  account  is  plausibly 
applicable  to  our  modern  understanding  of  law  governing  the  exchange  of 
property and provision of services.  The main point we should take from it is the 
differentiation  between  property  rights  and  the  claims  we  can  hold  against 
                                                 
11 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals §30   20 
another person, and the grounding of this difference in a certain view of the moral 
status of persons, and the kinds of powers we can have over other autonomous 
beings. It is important to note that according to Kant, the servant cannot even 
consent to becoming the mere property of his master in a real manner, in effect 
becoming a slave, because the servant’s negation of himself as a full moral person 
would render the contract invalid. This is not an unusual stance on the question of 
voluntary slavery, but the assertion that there is a contradiction in making a free 
choice to become a slave by subjecting oneself entirely to the will of another is 
problematic. One of the interesting things about prostitution is that it forces us to 
engage with the idea of sex workers selling access to their bodies like one might 
sell rights to a piece of property. There is a parallel to be explored between selling 
bodies in this way and the choice of voluntary slavery, and one which prompts 
liberal  reasoning  to  seemingly  paradoxical  responses.  I  will  return  to  this  in 
chapter III, but before addressing that question, it remains to be seen how these 
two meanings of money and the context of a paid transaction could characterise 
prostitution.  
 
Setting  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of  the  moral  permissibility  of 
claiming real ownership over a person or his body, it seems at least theoretically 
plausible that we could model prostitution to fit either of the two uses of money, 
which allows us to characterise prostitution in two different ways: 
 
(i) Prostitution as body selling: When a client exchanges money to have sex 
with a prostitute, the transaction is carried out on the model of selling 
certain claims over the sex worker’s body as a piece of property. The 
sex worker’s body is thus commodified in the sense that the client gains 
control of the sex worker’s body for a certain time and acquires rights 
of  use  similar  to  those  of  property  rights,  including  exclusive  use, 
control rights, perhaps even transfer rights. On this model, once the 
money has been paid, the sex worker’s body is wholly subject to the 
client’s will, and the client has unilateral control over it. Should the sex   21 
worker change her mind about the pre-agreed use to which her body is 
to be put, she has no claim to reclaim the control of access to her body 
that has been granted to the client.  
 
(ii) Prostitution as a personal service: The sex worker and client enter into a 
contract as fully autonomous individuals, each gaining a personal right 
against the other of fulfilment of the agreement. Both sex worker and 
client recognise each other as equal parties to the contract, and for the 
duration that the service contract holds, the client must consult with 
the sex worker for any particular service he wishes to be performed. 
Should  she  change  her  mind  about  providing  the  agreed  service, 
specific performance cannot be enforced. 
 
The next question to ask is whether it is plausible that adding payment to 
sex, and conducting it within the framework of accepted attitudes towards the 
wider meaning of money, can characterise prostitution in either of these ways in 
practical  terms.  If  both  of  these  characterisations  are  plausibly  attributable  to 
prostitution given the context of the monetary transaction, then it is evident from 
the  discussion  above  that  form  (i)  of  prostitution  as  body  selling  might  raise 
immediate  concerns.  Not  only  does  it  represent  a  significant  departure  from 
ordinary, unpaid consensual sex to a greater extent than form (ii), but it does so in 
a way that raises concerns about the preservation of the sex worker’s autonomy. 
So are these plausible characterisations of prostitution? Much of the public debate 
over prostitution certainly seems to be divided along similar lines to this, with 
those opposed to allowing legalised prostitution often talking about it in terms of 
women literally selling their bodies, while those with a more permissive approach 
downplay the special status of prostitution by comparing it to other common and 
widely accepted services that people carry out with their bodies12. 
                                                 
12 As  an  example  of  the  body-selling  stance,  Mary  Honeyball  MEP,  discussing  a  French 
Parliament vote to impose fines on clients who use the services of prostitutes on BBC Radio 4’s 
Woman’s Hour, said: “as long as men are able to buy women’s bodies, that is seriously detrimental 
to gender equality (…) this is not an occupation or a service like any other”. Nussbaum (1998) is an 
example of the latter stance.    22 
 
It should be noted at this point that there is a third option that is also 
commonly invoked, whereby the thing taken to be commodified and sold is not 
the bodies of sex workers, but rather their sexual labour13. This commodification 
of  sexual  labour  view  relies  on  certain  claims  or  assumptions  about  the 
inalienability of our sexual capacities or sexual labour. These inalienability claims 
further  rely  on  drawing  some  distinction  between  alienable  and  inalienable 
capacities by distinguishing those capacities which are extrinsic or intrinsic to the 
person, respectively14. So the argument that prostitution is wrong on the basis that 
sexual  labour  is  not  the  sort  of  thing  that  should  be  commodified  can  in  this 
regard be included under the characterisation of prostitution as body selling. This 
can be brought out if we consider what is meant by alienation of sexual labour. 
Alienation here must be distinct from merely sharing, because it seems that we 
share use of our sexual capacities any time that we have consensual sex. So there 
must be something about making that sexual capacity available to a client that 
means that it is alienated, rather than shared. This suggests the view that once 
sold, the client gains certain rights, claims and powers over that capacity, thereby 
giving him ownership over that capacity in a way that makes it subject to his will, 
rather  than  to  the  sex  worker’s.  The  capacity  is  thus  removed  from  the  sex 
worker’s control, much as one can alienate a piece of property to somebody else. 
We might on this view want to talk of prostitution as ‘capacity selling’, though 
sexual labour, even construed as an inalienable capacity, is so closely tied to the 
physical use of our bodies, that we can still apply the title ‘body selling’ here. On 
the  other  side  of  this  view,  if  sexual  labour  is  instead  viewed  as  an  alienable 
capacity, then it would seem to fall unproblematically under title (ii) of prostitution 
as  a  service,  just  as  a  pop  singer’s  capacity  to  sing  and  dance  might  be 
uncontroversially offered on the market. 
 
The challenge for the commodification of sexual labour view is to explain 
how to draw a principled line between those capacities which are intrinsic to the 
                                                 
13 Examples of this view can be found in Radin (1996) and Anderson (1990).  
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person, and those which are extrinsic. In particular, arguments that seek to show 
that  sexual  capacities  are  intrinsic  to  personhood  rely  too  heavily  on  dubious 
essentialist claims about our relations to sex. An additional complication for this 
view is that there seem to be many other commercial services that involve using 
capacities which strike us as equally intrinsic to our person as sex, but which are 
not  deemed  problematic,  for  example  teaching.  The  question  of  what  makes 
prostitution different from these other kinds of services is key to understanding 
where the puzzle of prostitution stems from. 
  
So far, it seems that the two characterisations of prostitution, modelled 
either on a property exchange or as a personal service, are plausible at least within 
the  terms  of  the  general  debate,  where  some  of  the  main  worries  about 
prostitution stem from concerns about the commodification of the body or its 
capacities,  and  that  treating  them  in  this  way  poses  some  risk  directly  to  the 
autonomy of the sex worker and indirectly to gender equality (perhaps through an 
inference  in  social  attitudes  that  all  women’s  bodies  are  up  for  grabs  to  be 
‘owned’).  The  real  question,  however,  is  whether  these  characterisations  are 
plausible  given  the  nature  of  sex  itself.  In  other  words,  is  there  something 
distinctive about sex itself which leads to the body being commodified as an object 
for trade?  
 
 
III. A PROBLEM SPECIFIC TO SEX? 
 
We can begin to answer the question of whether there is a problem specific 
to sex and prostitution by taking a closer look at the nature of the client’s desire or 
motivation for paying for sex, which, I take it, has two core elements. The first of 
these is that the client wishes to gain physical sexual gratification from the sex 
worker’s body. Secondly, it should also be noted that when a client goes to a sex 
worker, he is deliberately seeking out another living, breathing person to have sex 
with, as opposed to an inanimate sex toy. So to characterise the client’s motive   24 
purely in terms of sexual desire for a body as a mere object would be too simplistic. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that in many cases, the client’s desire is driven mainly 
by  the  element  of  physical  sexual  gratification,  and  that  this  involves  some 
measure of objectification in the sense of viewing the animate body of the sex 
worker as the object of this desire. So while the client desires to have sex with a 
living person, the desire itself is directed only towards that aspect of the person 
which is relevant to the sexual encounter. This may include certain capacities to 
move, talk, and display (or simulate) reciprocal desire, but is likely to exclude any 
regard for the sex worker’s wider psychological life, memories, emotions or beliefs. 
This is not to say that such desire is incompatible with also recognising the wider 
psychological life and attributes of one’s sex partner, just that the sexual desire 
itself is not directed towards these attributes.  
 
We find a view similar to this in Kant, who thought that this caused a 
problem  for  sex  itself  that  could  only  be  solved  by  formalising  the  sexual 
relationship within marriage15. The problem for Kant is a threat inherent in sex to 
the autonomous status of the persons involved. Without committing to that strong 
conclusion, this Kantian line of reasoning can shed some light on why sex causes 
concerns about autonomy, and why the introduction of money to the equation 
might exacerbate this. Barbara Herman16 explains Kant’s argument as follows. 
Sexual interest in another is not interest in the other as a person, but solely in the 
body and sexual attributes of that person. It is these sexual attributes that become 
the  object  of  interest.  This  causes  a  problem,  because  for  Kant,  the  body  is 
inseparable  from  the  person,  so  if  sexual  appetite  takes  as  its  object  the  body 
alone, then by extension it objectifies the person as a whole. But in regarding the 
other person as an object for the satisfaction of this desire, the humanity of that 
person as an autonomous being is subordinated to the desire. For Kant, it’s not 
enough to argue that you simultaneously respect the other person as a person even 
as you objectify his body for sexual use. In acting on the impulse of sexual desire, 
Kant would say, you are acting on an impermissible impulse, and subordinating 
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the humanity of your partner to that impulse. A passage on this from the Lectures 
on Ethics  strikingly  mirrors  many  contemporary  concerns  about  objectification 
arising from prostitution: 
 
“Taken by itself {sexual love} is a degradation of human nature; for 
as soon as a person becomes an Object of appetite for another, all 
motives of moral relationship cease to function, because as an Object 
of appetite for another a person becomes a thing and can be treated 
and used as such by every one.”17 
 
Kant’s fundamental worry here is that sex by its nature inevitably involves the use 
of another person as a mere means to the satisfaction of an appetite. Regard for 
the other person as a free and equal end in himself is excluded from the sexual 
appetite. This being the key element of personhood for Kant, the object of lust is 
therefore degraded to the status of a mere thing.  
 
We may well find this an implausible critique as Kant intends it to apply to 
all  sexual  activity,  but  the  central  thought  that  sexual  desire  can  lead  to 
objectification in this way is worth examining. And if it is true that sex can lead to 
the bodies of people being viewed as mere things, then it seems compatible with 
this that these things be treated as appropriate to buy and sell as commodities. 
Note  that  we  needn’t  even  stretch  to  accepting  that  the  person  is  necessarily 
degraded to the level of a mere thing when the sexual appetite subordinates the 
other as an object for its satisfaction, as Kant thinks. On the contrary, one might 
think it perfectly possible to separate respect for the person and sexual use of the 
body such that A can use B’s body as a mere tool to her sexual appetite, while 
bracketing  all  other  aspects  of  B’s  person  from  this  use.  Something  along 
colloquial lines of “Sure, she’s using my body, but she’s not using me.” We can 
even concede that in some cases, sexual desire may be directed towards exactly 
those aspects of personhood that are integral to free agency, such as when we find 
ourselves  sexually  attracted  to  features  of  personality  such  as  ambition, 
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intelligence, or wit. But even with these concessions, there is surely some truth in 
the claim that sexual desire viewed in a narrow sense purely as physical desire for 
a  body  has  the  tendency  to  objectify  the  body  as  a  mere  tool  for  its  own 
satisfaction. Crucially, it is not necessary for the fulfilment of sexual desire that any 
regard be paid to the personal attributes of the person whose body one desires, or 
whether they have a reciprocal desire.  
 
Setting  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of  whether  this  kind  of 
objectification  is  morally  suspect  or  not,  we  first  want  to  know  whether  such 
objectification is likely to happen when sex is had for payment, and if so, whether 
this could plausibly lead to the transaction being construed as an exchange of the 
body as property. If, as has been suggested above, it is the fact that regard for the 
wider personal attributes of one’s sex partner only contingently comes into sexual 
desire that can lead to an attitude of objectification, then it seems plausible that 
this wider regard for the person is more likely to be absent from a client’s sexual 
motive when paying for sex. As Carol Pateman18 has suggested, the client needn’t 
pay any regard to whether the sex worker has any reciprocal sexual desire for the 
encounter beyond her agreement to participate for a certain price. Indeed, the 
subtext of prostitution is that the sex worker would not be engaging in that act if it 
weren’t for the money, suggesting either a lack of reciprocal sexual desire or at 
least the complete irrelevance of this to the act. If the services are advertised in 
advance, it is presented as a given that once the client hands over the money, he 
will gain access to the object of his desire without having to engage with the sex 
worker on any personal level as to her reasons for engaging in that act with him in 
particular.  
 
The purpose of raising these points is not to advocate an essentialist view 
of sex as an activity that ought always to be characterised by reciprocity of desire 
or  some  level  of  personal  relationship,  nor  to  endorse  Pateman’s  claims  that 
prostitution inherently creates a master slave relation between the client and sex 
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worker.  The  point  is  merely  to  bring  out  that  if  there  is  an  element  of 
objectification in sexual desire in its most basic form, then it is plausible that when 
sex is bought, this tendency to objectification is amplified because there is less 
onus  on  the  client  than  in  even  the  most  casual  sexual  encounter  to  pay  any 
regard to the sex worker’s personal attributes, inner mental life, or reasons for 
engaging in the act beyond her physical sexual performance. This tendency in 
turn  makes  it  possible  that  the  transaction  be  viewed  by  both  client  and  sex 
worker as one in which the client pays for direct access to the object of his desire, 
in a way that subordinates that object (the sex worker’s body and sexual attributes) 
to the fulfilment of his desire.  
 
In light of this, we might think it plausible that the transaction has the 
potential to be characterised on the model of the client acquiring property rights 
over the sex worker’s body, because for the client to gain direct access to and 
control over her body as if alienated as a piece of property would be the most 
direct way of satisfying the client’s desire in the body as an object. If we were 
toeing the Kantian line, we would jump from this to concluding that the person, 
too, is ‘sold’ in this instance. But to refrain from committing too soon to morally 
loaded conclusions, we can say that perhaps the sex worker’s personhood needn’t 
come  into  it,  perhaps  this  can  be  bracketed  from  the  exchange,  and  the 
transaction really treated as an alienation of ownership over the body, and not 
quite the whole person.  
 
  This brings us as far as accepting that there is something about sex that 
makes it a strong candidate for leading to the commodification of bodies as things 
that can be treated like property to be bought, sold or hired. But this does not yet 
get to the heart of the puzzle, which is to explain what is special about sex that 
makes it more troublesome than other activities when conducted for money. We 
might  think  the  argument  above  could  well  apply  to  other,  more  innocuous 
activities.  
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Take ballroom dancing as an example. If I want to dance with somebody, 
my  appetite  for  doing  so  may  be  purely  based  on  a  desire  for  the  physical 
sensation I get from doing the polka. I can only get this kind of satisfaction if I 
have a dance partner of adequate height and skill, but I’m really not bothered at 
all whether he particularly likes dancing or just does it for the money. My appetite 
for  dancing,  then,  has  as  its  object  my  dance  partner’s  body  and  only  those 
characteristics of him that pertain to his dancing skill. I have absolutely no regard 
for his wider psychological life or any attributes that pertain particularly to his 
status as a free agent with his own ends to set. If I’m looking for a new dance 
partner and want to convince someone to dance with me on a Friday night, I 
contemplate two options. The first is that I can go to the local dance club and find 
someone there who will agree to dance with me, perhaps because he is looking to 
satisfy a similar appetite he has for dancing. This would involve engaging with 
him  on  a  personal  level,  probably  making  some  small  talk,  and  generally 
acknowledging him as a person with his own goals and reasons for dancing. The 
alternative is to leaf through the classifieds section of the club’s newsletter and find 
somebody who is advertising to hire himself out as a dance partner. I take this 
option because I’m short on time, and I never was a fan of small talk anyway. It’s 
convenient to me because as the client, I can get straight down to the business of 
dancing  and  bracket  away  the  particular  personhood  of  my  dance  partner  as 
something I needn’t engage with. It suits me to hire his body in this way, as I 
could hire a car to drive for a weekend. Once I’ve paid him the money for a 
certain number of hours, I know that I will be entitled to use his body to polka 
with for the duration of that time. 
 
  Does  this  not  mirror  the  way  in  which  the  sexual  appetite  leads  to 
objectification and commodification on the account given above? If it does, it 
seems  we  are  either  forced  to  concede  that  there  is  nothing  particularly 
problematic about prostitution, or that paying somebody to be a dance partner 
could lead to exactly the same kind of problem as prostitution does. If we want to 
take  seriously  the  intuition  that  there  is  something  different  about  sex  and   29 
prostitution, then we should try to identify some key differences between sex and 
activities like dancing which share the feature that the desire in each case is for a 
certain use of another person’s body as a thing.  
 
  One  way  of  drawing  out  a  difference  between  dancing  and  sex  is  to 
consider the mechanisms a person would have to use in order to coerce another 
into dancing or having sex with him. Getting somebody to dance with you against 
his will would require psychological coercion by means of intimidation such as 
physical or psychological torture or threats, in order to ‘persuade’ him to dance 
with you. These tactics, however brutal, work on the assumption that the dancer is 
an agent who makes decisions based on certain motives or reasons. The aim of the 
intimidation  tactics  is  to  force  the  dancer’s  balance  of  reasons  in  favour  of 
performing the task at hand. We can still say that the intimidated dancer decides 
(or  capitulates)  to  dance  with  the  coercer,  even  though  it  is  strictly  speaking 
against  his  will  to  do  so.  In  this  sense,  the  mechanism  involved  is  one  of 
manipulation of the dancer’s decision-making as an agent. This kind of coercion 
certainly violates Kant’s imperative to never treat another merely as a means, and 
insofar as the dancer is being treated as a mere tool to the end of the coercer, 
Kant would condemn this as treating the dancer in a way that subordinates his 
full humanity. But what is clear is that the coercer cannot treat the dancer as a 
mere object to be owned and directly controlled, because he must pay attention to 
the dancer’s own agency in order to successfully manipulate it towards his own 
ends. 
 
Sex differs here, because it clearly is possible in some cases for a coercer to 
achieve his end of sexual satisfaction by pure physical force – by raping his victim. 
Here, the mechanism by which the end is forcibly secured needn’t pay any regard 
to the agency of the person who is raped, so it is compatible for the coercer to 
view the victim’s body as a mere object, comparable to any other non-agential 
thing  one  might  possess.  Of  course,  this  may  not  apply  for  every  case.  For 
instance,  a  client  may  require  for  his  sexual  satisfaction  that  the  sex  worker   30 
present herself as though she is enjoying the encounter, and engaging in it of her 
own choice regardless of the money. In order to achieve this by force, the client 
would clearly have to use similar intimidation tactics to those discussed above. But 
the point I wish to make is that the mere fact that it is possible, given the nature of 
the act and the object of desire involved, that the object of sexual satisfaction be 
procured  by  pure  physical  force  with  no  regard  to  the  agency  of  the  victim, 
differentiates  sex  and  prostitution  in  some  respect  from  other  services  such  as 
dancing.  
 
There is a problem, however, that this criterion does not pick out sex on its 
own as a special case. It would also capture activities like that performed by the 
hypothetical colonoscopy artist suggested by Martha Nussbaum19 as an example 
of a bodily service that is intimately invasive without causing the same concerns 
that  prostitution  does.  The  colonoscopy  artist  gets  paid  to  have  the  latest 
colonoscopy equipment tested on her. Nussbaum’s point of course is precisely that 
the two activities are comparable, and that we only judge them differently because 
of the social stigma attached to sex. But if we want to find a principled distinction 
between these activities, we will have to dig a little further. One suggestion that 
has  been  made  to  distinguish  between  prostitution  and  colonoscopy  artistry, 
among  other  bodily  services,  is  that  it  is  not  essential  to  the  task  that  the 
colonoscopy artist be a person. If the technology existed to make a robot with all 
the relevant features for the test, then it would make no difference to the tester 
whether they use a real live person or the lifelike robot for the test. There may 
even  be  many  reasons  to  prefer  the  robot,  such  as  protecting  the  human  test 
subject from any risk of harm. The same can be said of dancing, where if I could 
procure a sophisticated dance robot, this would be just as good to me as hiring a 
person as my dance partner, their skill levels being equal. For most seeking sex 
from prostitution, however, it does seem integral to the task of achieving sexual 
satisfaction from a sex worker that the worker be a real live person, rather than a 
super-realistic sex robot.  
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On this view, what creates a problem is the fact that in seeking to pay 
somebody for sex, one is deliberately seeking out a person rather than an object to 
do this with. The goal that the client has in mind is precisely a certain use of a 
person.  This  is  contrasted  to  the  colonoscopy  tester  or  my  dancing  example, 
where the relevant goals are to test the equipment and for me to get my kicks from 
dancing, respectively. Though people can play the role of being a means to these 
ends, they could just as well be substituted by the right kind of sophisticated robot 
without affecting the achievement of the goal. Substitute a sophisticated robot into 
a sexual interaction, however, and the goal of gaining sexual gratification from a 
person is frustrated.  
 
We may well accept the basic premise of this line of argument. But it is 
then puzzling as to why this aspect of sex and prostitution should cause a problem. 
Going back to our Kantian toolkit, we can immediately condemn the principle of 
setting as one’s goal the use of another person as a mere means to the satisfaction 
of an appetite. But if we re-examine the colonoscopy artist and dancer cases, it is 
not clear that these would always escape Kantian condemnation either. Although 
they don’t have as their goal the use of a person in the same way, in cases where 
these activities use a person rather than a robot, that person is also vulnerable to 
being treated as a mere means to the intended end. This would seem then to be a 
fairly weak distinction between sex and these other activities. The second oddity 
with this line of argument is that if we’re worried about people being treated in a 
way that degrades their humanity by reducing them to mere objects, then why 
should  we  think  it  makes  it  less,  rather  than  more  problematic  if  the  person 
providing a certain service could just as easily be replaced by a robot? It seems 
we’ve now turned the original worry on its head, from being that the object of 
desire may as well be a mere thing, to being that the object of desire must be not 
merely a thing but a person.   
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And  yet,  there  is  something  in  both  of  these  suggestions  that  strikes  a 
chord. There is clearly something about the close relation between the body and 
the person that raises concerns when either the material ‘thing-like’ aspect of the 
body is dissociated from and given precedence over the agential qualities of the 
person, or when another is specifically coveted with the intention of using the 
person in a thing-like way. Prostitution seems to be special in combining elements 
of  both  suggestions  explored  above,  and  this  distinguishes  it  from  more  banal 
activities such as dancing. The combination is somewhat paradoxical – there is a 
strong  tendency  in  the  desire  to  treat  its  object  as  a  mere  thing  to  be  wholly 
subsumed under one’s own physical control, yet it is necessary to satisfying the 
desire that this specifically be the body of another person. This begins to look as 
though it will take us full circle back to the Kantian worry about persons being 
subordinated as objects to the desires of another. But to jump there would be too 
simplistic, not least because this would again lead us away from a specific point 
about sex and prostitution to a much more general principle about the right and 
wrong ways to treat people. And there are many wrong ways to allow oneself to 
be  treated  that  don’t  justify  interference  by  others,  let  alone  regulation  or 
prohibition under law. Nevertheless, it indicates that there is a particular tendency 
in the very nature of sex, which is amplified by the addition of money, that leads 
to  reasonable  concerns  about  the  kind  of  control  that  people  can  subject 
themselves to when offering their body for the use of another for sex.   
   
Viewed  this  way,  we  can  see  how  sex  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  being 
construed  as  a  commodity  in  the  sense  that  monetary  transactions  in  sex  are 
treated  on  the  model  of  a  property  exchange,  as  described  under  point  (i) 
prostitution as body selling. This is because if a client desires something that can 
be  regarded  as  a  mere  object  over  which  to  gain  control,  but  one  that  must 
deliberately be sought from a person, there is no great leap to treating people as 
owners of their bodies with the power to grant others control over them for a 
certain price. In some sense, for the client to gain direct access to and control over 
the sex worker’s body as if it is in the client’s possession would be the most direct   33 
way of satisfying the client’s desire in the body of the sex worker as an object.20 In 
what follows, I will explore the idea that subjecting sex to a monetary transaction 
within the framework of common market expectations about paying for possession 
of  a  thing  brings  up  a  series  of  challenges  for  liberal  principles.  Important 
questions arise about the extent to which a person can willingly sign away control 
of her own body and demand that her choice be formally recognised under law.   
 
On the other hand, the aspect of the client’s desire that is explicitly directed 
towards a certain type of interaction not with an inanimate body, but with a living 
person, necessarily brings with it the possibility of recognising that person as a full 
agent in her own right, with her own sexual desires and control over her own 
sexual life. There is nothing in the desire of the client or in the interaction itself 
which precludes the possibility of any instance of prostitution being characterised 
along the model of a service contract as described in point (ii). Given that under 
normal circumstances, consensual sex between two adults involves this mutual 
recognition  of  autonomy,  manifested  in  the  act  of  gaining  consent  from  one 
another, it seems clear that the addition of payment for the act needn’t necessarily 
change  this  fact,  as  the  institution  of  money  makes  room  for  this  kind  of 
transaction in the service contract. 
 
In the absence of any particular rules governing the mode of money exchange 
upon  which  prostitution  must  be  carried  out,  then,  it  seems  there  is  an 
indeterminacy  as  to  how  prostitution  as  a  class  of  transaction  is  defined  or 
characterised  as  a  whole,  and  it  remains  open  as  to  how  each  individual 
prostitution transaction is undertaken. I take this indeterminacy to be a problem 
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in two senses. First, in the sense of a puzzle to be solved – this indeterminacy 
challenges us to consider how and why the kind of ownership we have over our 
own bodies differs to the kind of ownership we can have over property, and the 
different  ways  in  which  these  may  be  permissibly  transacted.  Second,  the 
indeterminacy itself presents a moral and political problem. I will suggest in the 
following chapters that treating the body as property in transactions like those of 
body-selling is morally questionable in a way that is politically relevant given a 
liberal concern for protecting the autonomy of individuals. If prostitution contains 
the inherent indeterminacy of form suggested above, then prostitution as a class of 
activity  remains  problematic  as  long  as  the  indeterminacy  persists  and  the 
possibility remains open of individual transactions being carried out on the model 
of body-selling.  For now, I hope to have shown that there are adequate grounds 
to frame the problematic of prostitution in terms of this indeterminacy of form, 
and the consequences this has for the legitimacy of engaging in prostitution from 
the point of view of autonomy. The following chapters will take up the challenge 
posed  by  this  indeterminacy  –  to  investigate  the  ways  in  which  the  type  of 
ownership we have over our own bodies is, and isn’t, like the ownership we can 
have over other objects, and in what ways this may become the concern of the 
state within a political liberal framework.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE BODY AS PROPERTY? 
 
Having set up the indeterminacy problem within prostitution regarding whether 
the commercial transaction is characterised as service-provision or as body-selling, 
the next question to answer is: what is wrong with body-selling?  In order to 
answer this question, we need to tease out the distinction between property rights 
and bodily rights, in order to find out what kind of ownership we have over our 
own bodies. Clarifying the nature of bodily self-ownership will shed some light on 
whether this kind of ownership includes the right to sell or to hire out one’s body 
in the same contractual terms that one can sell or hire a piece of property one 
owns, such as a car or apartment. The focus will be on the kind of case in which a 
person willingly wishes to alienate her body as though it is property in this way. 
There is no doubt that there are current markets in sex based on exploitation and 
slavery, in which girls’ and women’s bodies are traded against their will as the 
property  of  pimps.  This  sort  of  trade  in  persons  is  obviously  wrong,  but  the 
multitude  of  wrongs  involved  make  it  harder  to  isolate  any  wrong  specific  to 
prostitution,  as  opposed  to  other  similar  forms  of  forced  slavery  and  physical 
abuse. Focussing instead on the hypothesis of a free agent who wishes to sell her 
body  as  property  will  help  us  to  abstract  away  from  contingent  problems  of 
domination and harm arising from prostitution and hone in on the core nature of 
the act itself. Another advantage of this approach is that it immediately brings out 
one of the key puzzles of prostitution for liberals. If liberal principles demand that 
agents be left free to act as they please short of causing harm to others, then if an 
agent makes a free and informed choice to engage in an activity which is deemed 
to carry some risk of harm to herself or threat to her autonomy, what reason could 
there be to prevent her from doing so?  
 
I shall begin by taking a closer look at a Kantian account of the grounding 
of property rights and the supposed incompatibility of having property rights in   36 
one’s  body.  This  account  is  of  particular  interest  because  it  grounds  both 
institutional property rights and natural bodily rights in the need to enact our 
autonomous nature, but suggests that attributing property rights over the body 
would be incompatible with the full and equal freedom of all. So if prostitution 
causes concerns about autonomy by blurring the lines between treating the body 
as a person and treating the body as property, then this Kantian line of reasoning 
provides a good starting point from which to investigate this problem.  
 
I. A KANTIAN DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BODY AND PROPERTY  
 
Barbara Herman, who suggests that it might after all be worth thinking 
about Kant on sex and marriage21, elucidates Kant’s argument for property rights 
in terms of a public institution providing a necessary solution to an otherwise 
unsolvable  moral  problem.  The  problem  Kant  identifies  is  this:  In  order  to 
exercise our full autonomous nature as rational beings, we need to be able to 
claim  things  in  the  world  as  our  own  property.  This  requires  using  force  to 
exclude others from using the things we want to (e.g. chasing others off a field we 
have  cultivated  to  grow  crops).  But  this  use  of  force  is  illegitimate,  as  it  is 
incompatible with the full and equal freedom of others, and so it lacks authority. 
In order to establish property rights that depend on authority rather than force, 
“We need an institution of property – conventions, conditions of enforcement – 
because  there  is  no  natural  “right  way”  to  allocate  possession.”22 We  might 
reconstruct this argument as follows: 
 
(1)  Exclusion by force of anyone from use of anything is wrong. 
 
(2) Without the possibility of rightful exclusion, secure use is impossible 
(morally impermissible). 
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(3) Since effective agency requires secure use (possession), a system of 
rights  and  coercive  enforcement  that  defines  conditions  of 
legitimate possession and use is necessary and justified. 
 
A puzzle in this argument is the step from (2) to (3), where we can ask why the 
implementation of a public institution of property is the necessary condition of 
legitimate possession. Indeed Arthur Ripstein points out that we can ask why a 
different Kantian option for defending rightful exclusion of others from something 
in  the  state  of  nature  couldn’t  apply  for  property,  namely  the  concept  of 
‘hindering a hindrance to freedom’23. The idea is that, in the state of nature, if 
somebody tries to interfere with you by, for example, trying to cut off your hand, 
you have a right to prevent them from doing so by force on the basis that the 
other  person  is  attempting  to  hinder  your  freedom,  which  is  contrary  to  the 
principle of the full liberty of each compatible with the equal liberty of all. So 
hindering this attempt at a hindrance of freedom by force presents no problem in 
terms of hindering the attacker’s freedom. Ripstein points out that we might ask 
why this doesn’t apply to property as well – if I need to claim property in order to 
exert my full freedom, why could I not defend my exclusion of others from it by 
force along the same lines? 
 
An illuminating response to this question is provided by Japa Pallikkathayil24, 
who argues that property rights suffer from three problems outside the context of 
civil  society:  (i)  an  indeterminacy  regarding  what  one  must  do  to  acquire  a 
property right and regarding what counts as interference with a property right; (ii) 
a problem of adjudicating for each case where reasonable disagreement arises as 
to whether principles of fair acquisition or protection from damage have been 
breached; (iii) each person would lack the assurance that others will abide by these 
rules.  These  problems  make  the  universalization  of  claims  to  property  and 
invoking a principle of ‘hindering a hindrance to freedom’ problematic, if not 
impossible without an institution laying down determinate rules for the acquisition 
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and protection of property. As Herman indicates, public rules are required to 
determine property rights because the question of how property rights are shaped 
is to some extent up for grabs. 
 
On the face of it, bodily rights do not seem to face this problem, because on 
Kant’s view, the innate right to freedom necessitates the right to one’s own body, 
as it is our body that anchors us in the world and allows us to act on our will. So 
there is no need to create a determinate system for the acquisition of bodily rights, 
because there are already naturally determinate rules for this.  
 
Granting it is already naturally determinate what counts as our own body, 
we can still ask whether the rights we hold over our naturally determined bodily 
boundaries  could  be  the  same,  or  similar  to  property  rights,  including,  for 
example, transfer rights. On the Kantian account, because property rights are 
acquired rights, in order to have some property right over one’s body, one would 
have to actively lay claim to it as one’s property at some point. If it were possible 
to do this, in order to be consistent with the equal freedom of others, it would 
have to be possible in principle for others to gain the same property rights in your 
body. But this possibility would be inconsistent with the innate bodily rights one 
has via the innate right to freedom25. So Pallikkathayil argues that the Kantian 
view  of  bodily  rights  grounded  in  the  innate  right  to  freedom  excludes  the 
possibility of having property rights in your body.  
 
For Kantians, bodily remain fundamentally grounded in our status as free 
beings and the innate right to freedom, and as such the main core of how bodily 
rights are conceived and protected is not ‘up for grabs’ as in the property case. On 
the basis of her claim that having a property right in your body is inconsistent 
with having an innate bodily right to it, Pallikkathayil concludes that this means 
we  have  no  direct  right  to  transfer  parts  of  our  bodies  to  others.  It  might  be 
possible to claim a property right in a body part that had been alienated from 
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one’s body, if rules were in place to determine what counts as alienation, but this 
would involve a two-step process of first removing the part from one’s body, and 
then  claiming  it  as  one’s  property  within  the  relevant  framework  of  property 
rights. 
 
This account grounds the separation of bodies and property firmly in the 
concept  of  the  innate  right  to  freedom,  and  by  positing  a  model  of  having 
property rights in the body as in tension with this grounding. Only by alienating 
an organ or appendage as no longer part of your body could you then claim a 
property right in it, at which point there is a public framework of property rights 
within which you could legitimately transfer it to somebody else. While it is part of 
your body, however, it is deemed to be inextricably linked with your person, and 
nobody can claim control rights over your person because this is incompatible 
with the full and equal freedom of all. Even if you were to willingly grant this type 
of  control  over  your  being  to  another  person,  this  for  Kant  would  be 
impermissible  because  the  bodies  of  persons  are  not  the  kinds  of  things  it  is 
permissible to sell, even if the body in question is your own. To do so would be to 
degrade your own moral status as a free and equal being. To recap, if I had 
property rights in my body, then it would have to be possible, in principle, for 
anyone else to claim property rights in my body. As such, any innate right to my 
body, and thus to the instrument that makes it uniquely possible for me to exercise 
my freedom, would be undermined.  
 
Kant’s wider views about the impermissibility of acting on sexual desire 
aside, if we consider the relevance of this view for prostitution, we can see how it 
presents a case against treating bodies as the kinds of thing that can be bought or 
sold on form (i) of prostitution as body selling outlined in chapter one. Though 
one might be able to get around the Kantian rules by alienating parts of one’s 
body,  the  type  of  body  selling  that  prostitution  would  involve  could  not  be 
achieved by alienating a part along these lines, as sex involves use of the body as a 
whole,  or  at  least  use  of  an  attached  body  part.  So  this  brings  us  towards   40 
suggesting that there may be legitimate reasons based on a concern for autonomy 
to  worry  about  prostitution  if  it  contains  this  possibility,  even  when  this  is 
undertaken entirely voluntarily. 
 
However,  there  are  problematic  gaps  in  this  account.  While 
Pallikkathayil’s argument provides plausible grounds for there being a distinction 
between property rights over external objects and the kinds of rights we have over 
our own bodies, one might still question why innate bodily rights must exclude the 
possibility of transferring control of one’s body or body parts to somebody else, as 
if it were one’s property. There would seem to be no tension on the reasons given 
between the principle of innate and equal liberty for all, and a claim that each 
person  has  innate  property  rights  over  his  own  body  from  birth.  In  order  to 
exclude  this  possibility,  a  further  argument  would  be  required  to  show  that 
transferring one’s bodily rights to another person is incompatible with autonomy.  
 
In order to address this question adequately, it will be worth taking a more 
careful look at the differences and similarities between bodily rights and property 
rights, and how both are linked to the autonomous expression of personhood. 
Particular attention will be paid to the ways that property exchanges and bodily 
interactions affect the pattern of claims and obligations people hold against each 
other when they enter into certain agreements together. The aim will be to draw 
out the implications of carrying out prostitution modelled on hiring a body just as 
one might hire a piece of property to see what goes wrong and in what way. This 
will provide some further insight into the specific ways that a person puts herself at 
risk when she sells or hires her body out as property, whether this be risk of harm 
or threat of diminished autonomy. And this, in turn, will provide a suggestion of 
what  kinds  of  reasons  there  could  be  from  a  politically  liberal  perspective  to 
regulate or prohibit these kinds of body transactions. 
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II. OWNERSHIP AS A CLUSTER CONCEPT 
 
While it is clear from the Kantian discussion that the rights we have over our 
bodies  are  not  all  simply  the  very  same  as  property  rights,  we  must  still  take 
seriously the suggestion that we own our bodies in a relevantly similar way to the 
way  in  which  we  own  property.  Whether  we  take  the  phrase  ‘bodily  self-
ownership’ as indicating that some of the very same claims involved in property 
ownership  apply  to  bodily  ownership,  or  whether  we  take  it  to  denote  an 
analogical relation between the claims we have over property and those we have 
over our bodies, the idea that we have some kind of ownership over our bodies 
plays a powerful intuitive role in notions of freedom and self-determination.  
 
To take a trivial example, if I own my shoes and my bag, I may customise 
my bag to match my shoes. I may also paint my fingernails to match my shoes 
and bag. In doing so, I seem to treat my fingernails as objects in the same way as 
my bag and shoes in some respects, both in my concern for the appearance of 
these objects and in exercising my power to control or modify their appearance. If 
I am going to a party with a friend of mine, I might also want his shoes, bag and 
fingernails to match mine, but I may not paint his shoes, customise his bag, or 
apply polish to his fingernails without his permission. If I try to do so, he might 
well complain “get off my bag!” or “get off my fingernails!” – they are his bag and 
his fingernails, and he has the exclusive right to determine what colour they be 
painted, if any, just as I have an exclusive right to determine the colour of my 
shoes, bag and fingernails, because they are mine.  
 
The distinction is intuitive: when it comes to deciding what happens to 
things like shoes, bags, or fingernails, the person who has the power to make those 
decisions is the owner of those things. It might sound odd to say that I am the 
owner of my fingernails, but we readily engage in the language of ownership in 
our everyday interactions. Let’s imagine some teenagers in an art class. One of 
them, Jenny, asks the teacher, “Miss, may I do some fingernail art?” The teacher   42 
might reply, “That depends, whose fingernails are you going to be painting?” If 
Jenny responds with “I am going to paint Max’s fingernails”, we can imagine the 
teacher replying “Well, make sure you get his permission first, but if he says no 
just paint your own.” We could just as well substitute the word ‘fingernails’ here 
for ‘pencil case’ and the exchange would sound as natural. This is because the 
teacher  has  overall  authority  over  the  activities  that  are  carried  out  in  the 
classroom under her supervision, but when it comes to certain permissible actions 
being carried out on pencil cases or on fingernails, it matters whom those pencil 
cases or fingernails belong to. It matters because the owners of those things have 
the last word as to what is done to the objects they own or the body parts which 
are theirs.  
 
So in some cases and with respect to some actions, at least, the idea of 
ownership over our bodies, or parts thereof, can be understood in the same way as 
ownership over property. There is at least some common ground between what it 
means for those fingernails to belong to Max (rather than Jenny) and for that 
pencil case to belong to Max (rather than Jenny), and what kinds of constraints 
Max’s ownership of those things places on the actions of other people. However, if 
we press a bit further, we begin to see some obvious ways in which pencil cases 
and fingernails differ.  
 
We can easily imagine a trade in pencil cases, whereby Jenny sells her 
pencil case to Max, so that Max becomes the owner of the pencil case. Having 
acquired the pencil case, Max may now do with it whatever he wishes. It would 
seem odd, though, to suggest a similar trade in fingernails, so that Jenny can buy 
Max’s fingernails, and thereby acquire all the same powers of exclusive use that 
Max  acquired  over  Jenny’s  pencil  case.  Admittedly,  the  case  is  complicated 
somewhat by the fact that Max’s fingernails are attached to his fingers, and that if 
Jenny  wanted  to  remove  Max’s  fingernails  to  physically  take  them  into  her 
possession, this would cause Max some pain and distress. But even if the putative 
sale were made on the condition that Max’s fingernails would remain attached to   43 
his hands, it wouldn’t seem quite right to say that those things attached to Max’s 
hands are now Jenny’s fingernails. Rather, we find the language of permission 
more  appropriate  here.  If  Max  cedes  some  control  over  his  nails  to  Jenny  in 
return for a sum of money, we are inclined to say that Max has given Jenny 
permission to use his nails in a certain way, perhaps to paint them whenever she 
likes. But even with this permission granted, we would still say that those are 
Max’s fingernails. And if they remain Max’s fingernails, he retains the power to 
decide  whom  he  gives  permission  to  paint  them  to.  So  if  he  tires  of  Jenny 
constantly painting his nails, he can revoke the permission he gave her to paint 
them whenever she likes. If Max sells his pencil case to Jenny, however, he cannot 
claim it back after the sale if he wants to regain control of it.   
 
But what if Max explicitly wanted to sell his nails in the very same way he 
can sell his pencil case? Perhaps he could demand a higher price for them this 
way, or perhaps he just doesn’t want the bother of ever having to think about 
what happens to his nails again. Would it be permissible, or even possible, for 
Max to give Jenny the same kind of ownership rights over his fingernails as he can 
give her over his pencil case? Even if a condition of non-removal of the fingernails 
from Max’s hands were built into the sale contract, what the sale would mean for 
Max is that he would no longer have the power to grant or revoke permissions as 
regards what happens to his nails. That power would be transferred to Jenny, and 
Max would have no right to claim it back.  
 
Does the kind of ownership we have over our bodies include the power to 
sell or rent parts of our bodies in this way? I suggest the answer is no. A plausible 
overview of the differences between trades in things like pencil cases and powers 
over body parts runs as follows. If Max sells his pencil case to Jenny, giving her 
exclusive use of it, and then changes his mind, he has no claim to take it back. If 
Max accepts money from Jenny to grant her exclusive use of his nails as regards 
their  painting,  and  then  changes  his  mind,  he  retains  the  right  to  claim  back 
control over the way his nails are painted. If he has accepted money from Jenny in   44 
return for her having this power over his nails, he may be obliged to compensate 
her by paying some or all of it back. However, Jenny would have no claim to 
forcibly  carry  on  painting  Max’s  nails  against  his  will,  as  she  would  to  retain 
possession of the pencil case if Max had sold that to her.  
 
The challenge is to explain why this is by fleshing out a fuller account of 
the ways in which bodily self-ownership and property ownership overlap, and in 
what  ways  they  differ.  This  should  help  to  clarify  why  rights  of  bodily-self 
ownership are held to be inalienable in the sense introduced above. In turn, this 
will  enable  us  to  pinpoint  how  and  why  things  go  wrong  when  a  person 
relinquishes certain ownership claims over her body to another person. The need 
for an explanation is especially pressing in cases where agents declare a voluntary 
intention to alienate claims over their bodies in just this way. The puzzle here can 
be seen in these terms: if an agent wants to sell or rent his body as a piece of 
property, what reasons are there for him to be denied the right to do so? Does 
having autonomous control or ownership over our bodies include the right to 
freely transact with our bodies in this way, or are there legitimate concerns about 
this way of ceding control over our bodies that merit restricting these transactions?  
 
I shall begin with a suggestion from Thomson that ownership is “a cluster 
of  claims,  privileges  and  powers”  in  regard  to  a  thing26,  and  that  a  useful 
distinction  can  be  made  within  this  cluster  concept  by  using  the  term  ‘First 
Property’ for our bodies and ‘Second Property’ for the other things we own. I shall 
take this distinction as my starting point, and investigate by way of example which 
clusters of claims, privileges and powers are involved in First Property and Second 
Property. The cluster of First Property will differ in some fundamental ways from 
the cluster of Second Property. Furthermore, there will be varying sets of claims, 
privileges and powers according to different types of ownership one can have over 
different  types  of  Second  Property,  according  to  whether  one  owns  a  listed 
building, for example, or a bar of chocolate. If we wanted to represent this idea 
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visually,  we  might  draw  a  Venn  diagram  with  several  circles  that  overlap  at 
different points, and some circles contained entirely within others.   
 
As indicated above, I will argue that one fundamental area in which the 
ownership clusters of First Property and Second Property differ is in the power to 
alienate  or  relinquish  all  claims,  privileges  and  powers  over  the  respective 
property. Ownership over First Property lacks this power, while ownership over 
Second Property includes it. An analysis drawing out the implications of renting a 
piece of property and a comparison with a parallel ‘body rental’ will suggest why 
this is. Working though examples, we will see that we lose track of certain moral 
wrongs if we treat transactions involving use of a person’s body on the same model 
as a property rental. Understanding the nature of these wrongs and how they 
might be explained by the significance of First Property and Second Property 
claims to the security and autonomy of individuals will then allow us to more 
clearly consider to what extent activities that trade the body as property present a 
legitimate concern within a politically liberal framework. This latter question will 
provide the focus of Chapter Three.  
 
 
III. RENTALS IN FIRST AND SECOND PROPERTY  
 
The first task at hand is to identify the relevant characteristics of the clusters of 
property  ownership  and  bodily  ownership,  and  to  tease  out  the  fundamental 
distinctions between the two. At the end of Thomson’s chapter on First Property, 
she leaves us with an open question:  
 
“There are differences as well as similarities between ownership of the likes 
of a typewriter on the one hand and ownership of one’s body on the other. 
There is a lot of me left if I sell my typewriter: all of me is left. What is there 
left to me if I sell my body? My soul? Anything at all? On some views, I just 
am my body, so to sell my body is to sell myself. On any view, I am more 
intimately related to my body than I am to my typewriter.    46 
To mark the similarities, I will say that people own their bodies. To mark 
the  differences,  I  will  say  that  people’s  bodies  are  their  First  Property, 
whereas everything else that they own – their houses, typewriters, and shoes 
– is their Second Property.”27  
 
The question, “What is there left to me if I sell my body?” is slightly opaque, but 
we can understand the force behind it better if we rephrase it in the following 
terms.  If  I  give  up  all  claims  over  my  body  by  selling  it  the  way  I  might  a 
typewriter, what moral status can I continue to have as a person? Earlier in the 
chapter, Thomson considers what it would be like for a person to lack the basic 
claims  of  First  Property,  which  include  claims  against  Trespass.  Trespass,  as 
Thomson uses the term, is a particular wrong identified as “a claim-infringing 
bodily intrusion or invasion”28. The case she imagines is where a person covets 
somebody  else’s  shoes.  We  are  to  suppose  that  agent  A  has  Second  Property 
claims over his shoes, but lacks First Property claims against Trespass. In this case, 
if agent B wants to take possession of A’s shoes, B will infringe a claim of A’s if he 
steals them. Given that A lacks claims against Trespass, however, it looks like B 
can instead legitimately kill A, after which he can claim the now ownerless shoes29. 
Thomson tells us this shows that A’s moral status would be very thin if he lacked 
claims  against  Trespass,  which  I  take  it  form  part  of  the  core  claims  of  First 
Property.  
 
Clearly, if I sell my body to someone else, then I too will subsequently lack 
any claims against Trespass. The new owner of my body will now have claims 
against others that they not interfere with my (now his) body, but if he chooses to 
destroy the body, or grant somebody else permission to do so, it looks like I would 
have no claim against such action. That is if the sale is modelled on exactly the 
same principles as the sale of a typewriter. So what is left of me if I sell my body 
this way? Well, I will have a very thin moral status, and this will put me in a 
precarious situation as regards my very existence. I take it that I would not cease 
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to exist as a person having merely sold my body, indeed I would still be attached 
to that body. I would, however, have lost all control over matters to do with my 
survival. Furthermore, the new owner of my body would have control over every 
physical manifestation of my inner mental life. Imagine he wanted to use my body 
as a smiling statue in a play he was putting on, and I felt like crying. He would 
presumably have a claim against me that I not make this body shed tears, just as 
he has a claim against anyone not to turn on the water feature in his garden if he 
wants it to remain switched off. We can see then that very little indeed is left of me 
if I sell my body – I am deprived of any guarantee of continued existence from 
one minute to the next, and I lack the power to express my inner mental life or 
show myself to the world in any way, for the only way we can do this is through 
our bodies. From the point of view of others, I may as well have vanished. I may 
still exist, but I can no longer continue to co-exist with other people.30 
 
What does this show us about body selling? Well, it certainly shows that 
selling one’s body in this most complete, and drastic way has bad consequences 
for the person whose body is sold, and that it is probably a very bad idea to enter 
into a sale of this sort. In fact, it even seems like a self-defeating move if the seller’s 
motive for the sale is purely monetary. Because as we saw above, once his body 
has been sold, the seller would lack the power to use his body to access and use the 
money he had acquired through the sale. But none of this yet shows that body 
selling must be outlawed. After all, people do lots of things that involve putting 
their own bodies at risk, and we tend to think that rational adults who understand 
the risks involved should have the freedom to do these things, even if we think 
them reckless. So if a person, let’s call him Bob, insisted that he wanted to sell his 
body in this way, having read and understood the above, would we have good 
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reason to prevent him from doing so? If we did step in and block the sale, the 
reason we would offer him would presumably be something like “it’s for your own 
good  that  we’re  stopping  you  from  doing  this.”  In  that  case,  Bob  might  well 
complain  that  we  were  acting  paternalistically  in  restricting  his  free  and  fully 
informed decision to sell his body. The charge of paternalism is one that will have 
to be met when it comes to preventing free agents from choosing to sell their 
bodies  in  this  way,  which  exposes  them  to  great  risk  of  danger,  and  will  be 
investigated in more depth in chapter three. 
 
The second objection to the picture I have presented of Bob selling his 
body does not rely on crying paternalism. A proponent of body-selling prostitution 
may well accept that the wholesale forfeiture of claims laid out in the Bob example 
will indeed turn out very badly for Bob, and that this may be severe enough to 
warrant interfering to stop him engaging in such a transaction. However, she will 
point out that this is due mainly to the fact that he is selling his body forever, and 
with no conditions placed on what use it may be put to by the new owner. But of 
course body selling in prostitution would not work like this, but rather on the 
model of a body rental. Just as when you hire a car there is a limit to the duration 
of the rental period and several conditions placed on the use of the vehicle, a sex 
worker will typically allocate her client a set timeframe for the transaction, and 
certain uses of the sex worker’s body will be ruled out. In this way, the risks of 
harm to the body-renter are minimized, and she retains a significant amount of 
personal control over her own body. The rental contract will merely secure terms 
of use and provide the client with a guarantee that he will have the required level 
of control over the rented body for his own ends. After all, the very purpose of 
contracts is to bind both parties to agreement over the provision of some good or 
service and provide security for each party against the other changing her mind. 
So what good reasons could there be against contracting use of one’s body to 
another party on the same model as a car rental? Is it permissible to treat our 
bodies as property in this way? 
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Let’s compare the cases to see where they come apart. We will begin to see 
the differences most clearly in cases where the terms of the contract are breached. 
The first case of breach will be where the client uses the rented object in a way 
that breaches the agreed terms and conditions of the rental. The second case will 
be  where  the  owner  changes  her  mind  about  the  terms  and  conditions,  and 
attempts to prevent the client from proceeding with the rental as originally agreed.  
 
We’ll begin with a car rental. Jenny rents her car to Max for the day, on 
the condition that Max not let anybody else drive the car. Shortly after picking up 
Jenny’s car, Max goes out driving with his friend Beth, and decides to let her drive 
for half an hour. No damage is sustained to the car. If Max has wronged Jenny, 
what is the nature of this wrong? I suggest that the wrong that Max has done to 
Jenny is explained by the fact that he gave Jenny his word that he would not let 
anybody  else  drive  the  car,  and  he  has  broken  that  agreement.  When  Jenny 
rented the car to Max, she gave him the power and privilege to control the car for 
the  day  in  exchange  for  his  word  that  he  would  not  transfer  that  power  and 
privilege  to  anyone  else.  And  when  Max  gave  Jenny  his  word,  he  created  an 
obligation on his part to stick by it, and gave Jenny a claim against him that he not 
allow others to use the car that was placed in his power for the day. The wrong 
here is the wrong of a broken agreement.  
 
Has Beth wronged Jenny? If Beth had simply taken Jenny’s car from its 
parking spot and driven it around for half an hour without her permission, then 
Beth would have violated a property claim of Jenny’s that nobody interfere with 
her car. So we might think that Beth has violated the exact same property claim of 
Jenny’s in the case where Max lets her drive the car, and has wronged Jenny in 
this  respect.  Is  this  right?  It  might  matter  whether  Beth  knows  that  Max  has 
agreed not to let anybody else drive the car. If she is aware of this fact and still 
takes  the  wheel,  we  might  think  that  her  act  of  driving  the  car  is  more 
blameworthy than if she lacks knowledge of the contractual terms. But even if 
Beth knows that Max is not supposed to let her drive the car, what is the nature of   50 
the wrong she commits when she drives it? I suggest that it is not the same wrong 
that Beth would commit were she to steal the car from Jenny’s driveway to take it 
for a quick ride. Instead, if Beth commits a wrong when she drives the car, it is the 
wrong of knowingly assisting Max in breaking the terms of the agreement.  
 
One way of understanding this is to construe the rental in the following 
terms. When Jenny rents the car to Max, she delegates to Max a certain power 
over her property, which is the power to control who can permissibly interfere 
with the car. Jenny as the owner of the car has a general claim against others 
interfering  with  it,  which  she  can  waive  with  regard  to  specific  individuals  by 
giving  them  permission  to  use  the  car.  When  she  rents  the  car  to  Max,  she 
delegates  this  power  to  him  while  the  car  is  in  his  possession.  Hence  the 
importance of the terms and conditions. They are essentially of the form: I am 
transferring this power to you on the condition that you use it in certain ways.  
 
If this is the case, then we can think of the claims that hold against Beth as 
follows. Jenny’s having exclusive ownership of the car includes a claim that holds 
against Beth (and all others) that they not interfere with her car. Jenny as the 
owner has the power to waive this claim as it pertains to specific individuals to 
whom she grants consent to use the car. When Jenny rents the car to Max, she not 
only waives this claim as it pertains to him, but she also entrusts him with the 
power to grant and refuse permission to others to use the car. That is, Jenny 
entrusts Max with the power to waive the claims against interference with the 
property that hold against all others. When Max hires the car, it is thus in his 
possession in the sense that he has acquired relevant control rights and powers 
over it. Though Jenny has entrusted these powers to Max, she may include a 
clause stipulating that he must agree not to use these powers to allow anybody else 
to use the car. 
 
When  Max  gives  Beth  permission  to  drive  the  car,  he  is  therefore 
exercising a power that he has been entrusted with, but has promised not to use. If   51 
Beth knows that Max has made this promise, she does something wrong when she 
drives the car insofar as she is complicit in the breaking of Max’s promise. But, I 
suggest, she violates no property claim of Jenny’s, because Jenny has delegated the 
power to waive such claims to Max, and Max has waived this claim in regard to 
Beth. If Beth wrongs Jenny, it would be insofar as Jenny has a claim against all 
people that they not act in any way as to help Max break his promise to her. I am 
sceptical as to whether such claims are included in the morality of promising, but 
whether or not they are is not crucial to the matter at hand. The main point I 
think we should take from this case is that Beth does not violate any property 
claim of Jenny’s when Max gives Beth permission to drive Jenny’s car. Rather, the 
wrong that has been committed is Max’s wrong of breaking his agreement by 
abusing the powers he has been granted over the car.  
 
If we now compare a similar case to an example of body renting, we’ll start 
to see where body ownership and property ownership come apart. Here we’ll 
suppose that Alice has agreed to rent her body to Oliver, on the agreement that 
Oliver may have sex with Alice’s body, but may not permit anybody else to touch 
it. Furthermore, to more closely mirror the car rental case, we’ll suppose that 
Alice will take a sedative and be unconscious for the duration of the rental31. 
During that time, Oliver’s friend Thomas asks to use Alice’s body for sex. Oliver 
tells Thomas that Alice asked him not to let anybody else use her body in that 
way, but tells Thomas that he may, and that he is willing to take full responsibility 
for this. Who has wronged Alice in this case? If we follow the car model above, 
we’ll say that Oliver has wronged Alice by breaking their agreement, and that we 
may disapprove of Thomas for playing a part in the breaking of that agreement, 
but that Thomas commits no separate wrong of violating some claim of Alice’s 
over her own body. Rather, Alice has delegated the power of control over her 
                                                 
31 This clearly is not an accurate representation of how a prostitution encounter would standardly 
be carried out, even if we accept the characterization of prostitution as body-selling. However, if 
prostitution becomes problematic when both parties consider the transaction to be one of body-
selling,  then  it  seems  plausible  that  the  sex  worker  would  take  herself  to  retain  the  ability  to 
exercise her ownership claims if these had been transferred to the client. The hypothesis of Alice 
being unconscious simply allows us to model this disempowerment abstracted for the moment 
from other issues that may contribute to this, such as psychological or physical coercion.       52 
body to Oliver on the condition that he use this power only in certain ways, and 
the responsibility for abuse of this power lies fundamentally with Oliver. On this 
account, the wrong that Thomas commits (if any) would not be the same wrong as 
he would commit if he came across Alice’s unconscious body when it was not 
rented out to Oliver and decided to have sex with it, even though he knew that 
Alice did not want anybody interfering with her body that day.  
 
This account clearly does not adequately explain the wrong of this act. 
Oliver cannot take responsibility for Thomas having sex with Alice’s body in the 
same way that Max can take responsibility for Beth driving Jenny’s car. So when 
Thomas has sex with Alice while she is unconscious, knowing that she intended to 
rent  her  body  exclusively  to  Oliver,  Thomas  wrongs  Alice  in  just  the  way  he 
would if he came across and had sex with Alice’s unconscious body on any other 
day without her permission. Following Thomson’s terminology, Thomas directly 
wrongs Alice by infringing a bodily claim she holds against all others that they not 
commit Trespass.  
 
What explains the difference between these two cases? I suggest it is the 
different ways that claims are forfeited over the ‘property’ in question in each case. 
In the car-rental case, a piece of Second Property is handed over to the control of 
another person in such a way that all power to determine what happens to the car 
is placed in the hands of the renter, under an agreement as to how the renter will 
use those powers. But if you share the intuition that Thomas directly wrongs Alice 
in the way that Beth does not directly wrong Jenny, then the forfeiture of powers 
over a body must differ. My suggestion for how it differs is this. Though Alice 
consents to certain uses of her body by Oliver, she does not forfeit or delegate 
power over what use the body is put to during that time. Rather, it seems that at 
most, Alice waives a specific claim in regard only to Oliver, and retains all her 
general claims against all others with regard to use of or interference with her 
body. This would explain why Oliver cannot take responsibility for Thomas using 
Alice’s body in the same way that Max can take responsibility for Beth using   53 
Jenny’s car, because he has not been entrusted with the relevant powers to do so. 
So  the  difference  seems  to  be  that  while  the  car  rental  example  involves  the 
delegation of some powers over the car, a case involving use of the body at most 
can involve the owner waiving specific claims in relation to a specific individual.  
 
This indicates one way in which Second Property and First Property come 
apart as regards owners contracting for use of their property to others. The claims 
that each owner holds over the ‘property’ in question may be the same in terms of 
claims against interference, exclusive control rights, etc., but there is a crucial 
difference in the way that these claims can be waived or forfeited. The detail, 
however, is still unclear, and the above examples may leave some unconvinced, 
relying as they do on a pull of intuitions. The distinction will become clearer, I 
believe, when we consider the second case of breach of contract, in which the 
owner changes her mind about the terms and the conditions of the rental halfway 
through.   
 
To return to Jenny and Max, we’ll imagine that Max has rented the car in 
order to drive from London to Oxford, and that Jenny has agreed to Max making 
this journey with the rented car. Both parties have signed the contract, and Max 
has paid the money for this rental. Shortly after Max has set off, however, he 
receives  a  phone  call  from  Jenny  demanding  that  he  not  take  the  car  out  of 
London after all, because she is uncomfortable at the thought of it being driven on 
the  motorway.  If  Max  ignores  Jenny’s  request  and  drives  the  car  to  Oxford 
regardless,  has  he  wronged  her  by  infringing  any  claim  of  hers?  I  believe  the 
answer is no. Having delegated power over the car to Max under those terms, 
Jenny has no claim to demand it back until the contractual period is over. If Jenny 
is really in great distress at the thought of her car being driven on the motorway, it 
may  be  insensitive  of  Max  to  take  it  anyway,  but  he  would  not  infringe  any 
property claim of Jenny’s in doing so. 
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If we compare this to the body rental case, we will again get a different 
answer. This time awake, Alice has agreed to rent her body to Oliver for 20 
minutes so that he may use it for sex. However, shortly into the encounter, Alice 
becomes uncomfortable with it and changes her mind. She tells Oliver this and 
asks him to stop. As in the car rental case, both parties have signed the contract, 
and Oliver has paid the money for this rental.  Does Oliver wrong Alice if he 
carries on regardless? I believe the answer is yes, and he wrongs her in a very 
serious way. This is because when Alice agreed to Oliver using her body for sex, 
she forfeited a claim with regard to Oliver that he not interfere with her body in 
that specific way. However, Alice crucially retained the power to reinstate that 
claim  against  Oliver.  When  she  changes  her  mind  about  the  interaction,  she 
therefore  legitimately  reinstates  the  claim  she  holds  against  him  that  he  not 
interfere with her body. So if he carries on despite her complaints, he infringes this 
claim, and commits the grave Trespass of rape.  
 
If contracting out the use of one’s body differs in this way from contracting 
out pieces of Second Property for use by others, then the two types of transaction 
are significantly different in nature. With rental contracts for Second Property, the 
owner of the property can be held to the terms of the contract so that despite her 
complaints,  Jenny  will  have  no  claim  against  Max’s  use  of  the  car  within  the 
agreed  terms32.  With  First  Property,  however,  it  looks  like  the  client  cannot 
legitimately hold the owner of the body in question to the terms of the contract in 
order to demand specific performance, as to do so would violate an important 
claim of hers. In this respect, then, contracting use of the body must follow the 
model of service provision, rather than property exchange or rental, because it 
                                                 
32 At least not in the sense of having a claim within the framework of her property rights over the 
car. There may, however, be situations in which there would be an obligation on Max to return 
the car, for instance if Jenny urgently needed the car to take an injured friend to hospital. In cases 
like this, however, we can understand the obligation as stemming from general duties one might 
have to help others. So that there would be a duty on Max as the person in possession of the car to 
use it to help a person in need, as it is within his power to do so. Jenny, knowing that Max could 
help by returning the car, may have an obligation to request that he help in this way, and Max 
may do wrong if he decides not to help, but the wrong would not be a violation of Jenny’s property 
rights, but rather a wrong of not fulfilling a duty to help another when it is in his power to do so.   55 
seems that we start to lose track of some serious wrongs when the body is ‘rented’ 
in the same way as a piece of property. 
 
 
IV. CONSENT, DISSENT & THE OPERATION OF TRESPASS CLAIMS 
 
There is a question to be raised about this account though. It might be 
suggested that the difference lies not in some fundamental distinction between the 
ways in which claims can be alienated over First and Second Property, but rather 
that there are other reasons that determine the permissibility of what is done to a 
piece of property or a body. For example, one might argue that cars are generally 
of little value, so can be used and manipulated by people in various ways without 
problem. The bodies of persons, however, have some important value such that 
some uses of a person’s body are just plain wrong, regardless of who may have 
ostensibly granted permission for it. But this needn’t be a feature about bodies in 
particular, as there are examples of other types of Second Property for which this 
also applies. Take, for instance, a listed building. An owner of a listed building 
may  rent  it  out  for  somebody  else  to  live  in,  but  may  not  grant  the  tenants 
permission to renovate the building in a way that alters its original character. If 
the  tenants  do  so,  they  will  have  committed  a  wrong,  regardless  of  what  the 
landlord may have told them they were permitted to do, just as we want to say 
that Thomas has committed a wrong regardless of whether Alice purports to have 
yielded control rights over her body.  
 
To separate these two cases and tease out the relevant distinctions here, 
let’s consider a less morally loaded example for the body-rental case. Suppose that 
Alice agrees to Oliver using her sedated body for an art installation he is creating, 
and for which he wants a live human body to manipulate into spontaneous poses. 
Alice agrees that Oliver may use her body in whichever way he may be artistically 
inclined. She also owns a listed building, which she agrees Oliver may also use 
and manipulate however he likes for his art installation. The critic might ask here,   56 
isn’t  the  difference  just  that  Alice  cannot  give  permission  for  Oliver  to  do 
something wrong, whether it is to the building or to her body? In a sense, the 
answer to this question is yes, but this relies on an understanding of the differences 
between  the  ways  in  which  the  claims  of  bodily  ownership  and  property 
ownership  operate  in  each  case.  In  the  case  of  the  listed  building,  Alice’s 
ownership of the building does not include the power to alter it in a way that 
changes  its  historical  features.  This  is  what  explains  the  ineffectiveness  of  the 
permission she might think she gives to another person to paint the front of the 
house, for instance. It is not the case that Alice has this power but lacks the power 
to alienate it, but simply that the power is not included in the ownership cluster 
for a listed building. If we refer back to section I of this chapter, we can explain 
this by reference to the fact that property ownership rights arise as an institutional 
construct, and what goes into any given ownership cluster for Second Property is 
partly ‘up for grabs’. Though it may be necessary in order for individuals to be 
able to enact their autonomy for each to be able to claim secure use of some 
property,  the  specific  set  of  powers  and  claims  an  individual  can  have  over 
different  types  of  property  can  to  a  certain  extent  reasonably  be  shaped  by 
reference  to  other  values  in  the  public  interest.  So,  for  example,  regulation 
restricting the renovation or destruction of listed buildings, even where these are 
privately  owned,  may  be  justified  by  a  public  interest  in  protecting  cultural 
heritage. In this case, the power to paint the front of her house was never included 
in Alice’s ownership cluster over the house, and this is what explains her inability 
to grant this power to anybody else.  
 
Contrast this to the cluster of claims, privileges and powers that Alice has 
over her own body, and a clear difference emerges. Unlike for the listed building, 
Alice does have the relevant powers to determine what be done to her body to 
cover pretty much any use it might be put to. As we saw above, Alice can waive 
any claim to non-interference in respect of a specific person or act by consenting 
to it. Considered individually, the waiving of such claims presents no particular 
problem. But when we consider the case above in which Alice grants Oliver carte   57 
blanche to do as he likes with her body while she is sedated, this again strikes us as 
problematic. Again, to compare to the building, if Alice has the power to invite 
anybody she likes into her building, there seems to be no problem with her renting 
the building to tenants and granting them the power to invite anybody they like 
into it during their tenancy. But it does not seem that Alice can grant Oliver 
similar power over her body, as suggested above. And the explanation for what 
goes wrong if Oliver were to grant another intrusive access to Alice’s body is not 
simply that certain intrusive acts would be wrong per se, but that the wrong is 
explained by virtue of the fact that such intrusions violate a bodily trespass claim 
of Alice’s which she has not waived.  
 
But,  it  might  be  argued,  couldn’t  we  conceive  of  Alice’s  expression  to 
Oliver,  “do  whatever  you  like  with  my  body”  to  express  not  a  delegation  of 
powers to him, but rather that whatever Oliver chooses to do with her body, she 
has waived that specific claim with regard to him. So Oliver still has no power of 
control over which claims are waived, it is just that Alice has chosen to waive all 
claims in respect of Oliver simultaneously.  This would seem to fit the way in 
which  we  said  that  bodily  claims  must  function,  and  yet  still  leave  Alice  in  a 
position that is equally as vulnerable as the one in which it was supposed she had 
‘rented’ her body to Oliver by delegating control over which bodily claims of hers 
could be waived. And in this sense, is there much difference at all between Alice’s 
body and the rental car? 
 
This last question prompts us to return to the very first scenario in which it 
was stipulated that Alice would be unconscious for the duration of the ‘rental’. 
This  was  supposed  in  order  to  more  closely  mirror  the  car  rental  case,  and 
because it presents a plausible illustration of a way in which it is possible to really 
treat the body as alienable in a very similar way to property. It seemed plausible 
not only that people could in fact behave and interact in this way, but also that it 
could well come under the sphere of legitimate things that Alice could do with her 
body  to  grant  Oliver  permission  to  use  it  in  the  way  specified  while  she  was   58 
unconscious. However, if the last case of breach indicated to us that one of the 
crucial aspects of First Property claims is that a person must retain the power to 
reinstate any claims she may have previously waived, then we may well question 
whether Alice can legitimately grant anybody access to her unconscious body after 
all. The above case showed us that if Alice objects to a certain act being done to 
her body, she must retain the power to reinstate her claim against that act being 
done  to  her.  If  she  is  unconscious,  she  clearly  lacks  the  ability  to  object  to 
anything, not only in the sense of expressing objection to what is being done, but 
also in the sense that she has no experience that she could find objectionable.  
 
So we might think that there is no problem here to worry about, because 
nothing is being done against her will, her will being momentarily dormant, so to 
speak. But this cannot capture the core concern about how Alice’s body is put to 
use, because if we think back to the first case of breach of contract, in which 
Oliver allowed Thomas to have sex with Alice, then we can see that in that case, 
there was also no experience for Alice which she would have found objectionable. 
She may not even ever find out about what was done to her body by Thomas 
while  she  was  unconscious.  If  she  never  finds  out,  someone  might  say,  “well 
where’s the harm?” And as liberals, aren’t we supposed to worry most about harm 
done to others? This would be an uncomfortable conclusion, to say the least. But 
the question prompts us to provide more detail as to how claims against Trespass 
work, and how First Property Trespass differs from trespass on Second Property.  
 
We  have  already  established  that  claims  to  Second  Property  include 
general claims against all others that they not interfere with your property, which 
can be forfeited by the owner giving others permission to use the property, or 
selling it completely. Claims to First Property similarly include claims against all 
others that they not interfere with your body, which can be waived by the owner 
consenting to certain acts being done to or with her body by certain people. If we 
take this simple description at face value, though, there will be a great many acts 
that end up being labelled as Trespass. For instance, it seems plausible within this   59 
framework that I have a general claim against all others that they not stroke my 
arm. And I can of course waive this claim by giving someone permission to do so. 
But if I am on a packed rush hour tube in London, and a stranger brushes against 
my  arm  as  they  edge  past  me  to  leave  the  tube,  have  they  done  wrong  by 
committing Trespass against me?  
 
It  would  seem  overly  stringent  to  understand  infringements  of  bodily 
claims in this way. A more plausible suggestion is that a person who brushes my 
arm does something wrong if, when they brush my arm, I ask them to stop doing 
so and they carry on regardless. So while it is true that I hold general claims 
against Trespass, these claims become relevant to determining whether an act 
constitutes  a  wrong  insofar  as  an  agent  enforces  those  claims  against  another. 
Trespass  claims  instate  a  general  presumption  against  the  permissibility  of 
interfering  with  the  body  of  another,  but  just  as  this  presumption  of 
impermissibility can be overturned by the individual in question consenting to a 
certain act, so it can be cemented by the individual expressing dissent towards a 
certain act. If another person strokes my arm to catch my attention, and I turn 
and smile at them, telling them to carry on, they have done me no wrong. If they 
stroke my arm, I ask them not to, and they carry on, they have done me wrong by 
infringing a claim that I am explicitly exercising against them at that point in time. 
The complication arises if they stroke my arm, I complain, they immediately pull 
their hand away from me, and I feel violated for having been touched in this way. 
If we think that the person who touched me when it was welcome without asking 
did no wrong before it was clear to them that I consented, in what way could the 
second person have done me wrong before I dissented? One suggestion is this. 
Trespass claims create a presumption that one must not interfere with the bodies 
of others, although the permissibility of each specific act of bodily interference 
depends on whether the person whose body is touched dissents or consents to that 
act, even if the explicit expression comes after the initial touch. So when you 
touch my arm uninvited and I say “get off, don’t touch me!”, that makes your   60 
touching me an act of Trespass from the very beginning. But if I turn and smile at you 
and invite you to carry on, then no Trespass has been committed at all.  
 
One might think this requires us all to be mind readers in order to make 
sure we never commit these wrongs. But it perhaps just stresses the need for clear 
communication  in  our  physical  interactions  with  others,  and  an  intuitive 
understanding of nuanced social situations and relationships. This is messy, but so 
are most human interactions and relationships. It has the advantage that it can 
explain why a stranger does me no wrong when he brushes against my arm on a 
busy tube. The fact that I have put myself on the tube during the busy rush hour 
implies that I understand that this level of touching may be unavoidable, and that 
I am at least willing to tolerate it as one of the things that goes along with being on 
a busy tube. Likewise, if I am watching a film with a close friend and she strokes 
my arm to get my attention to see if I want a cup of tea, she will have an idea from 
the nature of our friendship and past behaviour patterns that I am very unlikely to 
object to this. Change the situation to a quiet street and a stranger who strokes my 
arm to get my attention, if I object to this, I may well tell him “get your hand off 
my arm, you have no right to touch me”. He has committed Trespass even if his 
intentions  were  innocuous  because  there  was  a  presumption  that  each  holds 
claims against bodily touching, and no indication that this intrusion would be 
welcome. Though the very same act would not have been Trespass if I did not 
object or dissent to it, when the stranger touched my arm, he took a risk that his 
act  would  be  one  of  Trespass.  Without  any  prior  knowledge  of  my  attitudes 
towards  being  touched  in  this  way,  and  no  other  indicators  that  I  may  be 
prepared to tolerate this as there are in the tube case, even a stranger would be 
able to know that the risk that I would react negatively to such touching is fairly 
high, and we could hold him blameworthy accordingly.  
 
But  having  cashed  out  Trespass  claims  in  this  way,  we  are  still  left  to 
answer the question of why it would matter if something was done to Alice’s body 
while she was unconscious, if no harm was done and she never found out about it.   61 
Though there is no consent in this case, there is clearly no dissent either, as Alice 
remains unaware of what is done to her body. If there is simply a presumption 
against bodily interference that is made concrete when an agent dissents, then 
without this dissent, one might compare the case of Thomas touching Alice to that 
of the stranger brushing against my arm on the tube. Without consent or dissent, 
it seems if Thomas gets away with it, then no Trespass has been committed. After 
all, it is possible that Alice could wake up and then consent to Thomas having sex 
with her body, such that the act would never have been one of Trespass from the 
beginning.    In  that  sense,  the  moral  permissibility  of  the  act  would  be 
indeterminate  until  Alice  decrees  either  consent  or  dissent,  and  remain 
indeterminate if she never finds out.  
 
This  too  is  an  uncomfortable  conclusion,  and  one  that  we  need  not 
endorse. For if the powers of consent and dissent can make such a difference to 
the  moral  permissibility  of  an  act  done  to  a  body,  then  it  is  surely  of  great 
importance that it be possible for these powers to be exercised in each case. The 
main  point  of  having  these  bodily  claims  is  not  simply  to  protect  us  from 
interference from others, but to give each person the power to determine the 
permissibility of acts done to her, and thus retain meaningful autonomy over what 
she does with her body, and what is done to it. In light of this, if we think back to 
the Thomas case, we shouldn’t think of the wrong he does as simply consisting in 
having sex with Alice without her consent, but rather that he had sex with her 
while she was incapacitated with regard to use of her powers of consent or dissent. 
The phrase ‘he took advantage of her’ is appropriate here, as he took advantage of 
the opportunity to use Alice’s body at a time when there was no possibility of her 
making it clear to him that his act was permitted or not. To do so is to subvert this 
system  of  moral  powers  to  one’s  own  advantage,  at  the  expense  of  another 
person’s bodily boundaries. It is not the same wrong as raping a conscious person 
against her will, but that is not to say that it is any less wrong. 
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Having found that it is of great importance to the moral significance of 
bodily claims against Trespass that agents retain the power to consent or dissent to 
certain acts being done to them, then we may well question the legitimacy of any 
agreement between Alice and Oliver, in which she agrees to carte blanche use of 
her unconscious body. For if we think it of central importance that Alice retain the 
power to reinstate her claim against interference in the case where she is awake, 
then  surely  something  important  is  lost  from  the  interaction  when  Alice  is 
unconscious and that power is shut off. We might, however, think that when Alice 
agrees to a very specific use of her body beforehand, this makes the terms clear 
enough  so  that  Oliver’s  use  of  Alice’s  body  is  cemented  as  a  permissible  act, 
because  he  has  Alice’s  assurance  beforehand  that  she  is  happily  forfeiting  a 
specific claim against him, and that she is not concerned by the fact that she will 
have no experience of the act and no ability to dissent to it while it is underway33. 
 
We’ve now got a clearer view of the similarities between property claims 
and bodily claims, as well as some fundamental differences between the two when 
it comes to the way that claims and powers over the property in question can be 
waived or forfeited. It seems that there is good reason to think that agents open 
themselves to the risk of being wronged in certain ways if they trade in their 
bodies in the same way one can trade in a piece of property. But we can still ask, 
what if Alice explicitly states that she wishes the agreement over use of her body to 
be conducted under a contract of the same type as the car rental, with the same 
implications for breach of contract? What are the reasons for denying Alice the 
power to dispose over her body in this way? The above discussion has shown how 
the alienation or delegation of Second Property claims differs from agreements for 
use of First Property by others. It has been suggested that when an owner rents 
her Second Property to somebody else, this involves a delegation of the owner’s 
powers over that piece of property to the renter, on the agreement that the renter 
will refrain from exercising these powers in certain ways. When it comes to First 
Property, however, we lose track of certain serious moral wrongs if we follow this 
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model, and place under threat the very function of bodily powers that is integral 
to retaining autonomous control over our bodies. A better explanation for the way 
in which an owner of First Property contracts use of her body to another person is 
simply through the forfeiture of certain specific claims, where the owner retains 
the power to reinstate those claims at any time.  
 
But Alice still has a legitimate challenge, which is to say that if she knows 
that renting her body in this way subjects her to the risk of harm and poses a 
threat to her autonomy by denying her the central moral powers of consent and 
dissent, but still wishes to proceed with this, is this not a restriction of the freedom 
she can exercise over her own body? Two options are available here in response 
to the challenge. The first is to say that respect for autonomy demands that we 
prevent agents from alienating power over their bodies in this way, because this 
decision  is  one  that  undermines  autonomy.  The  opposite  response  also  seems 
plausible though, which is to say that if we respect the autonomy of individuals, 
we should respect any autonomous choice they make which concerns the use of 
their own body, even if this is a free choice to relinquish some or all of their 
autonomy. It is not immediately clear which option we should endorse within a 
politically liberal framework. The next chapter attempts to answer this question. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
OWNERSHIP, AUTONOMY, AND VOLUNTARY SLAVERY  
 
 
So far in the investigation into what is wrong with body selling, I have put forward 
some considerations in favour of three claims. First I suggested that we should 
follow Thomson and view ownership as a cluster concept denoting a set of claims, 
privileges  and  powers  over  a  thing.  Given  that  there  are  relevant  similarities 
between the kinds of claims, privileges and powers that we have over our bodies 
and those we have over property, and that there are many ways in which we can 
treat  our  bodies  as  things,  the  concept  of  ‘bodily  self-ownership’  can  play  an 
illuminating  role  in  discourse  around  freedom  and  self-determination.    The 
purpose of comparing bodily ownership with property ownership is not only to 
identify broad similarities, but rather to draw out some fundamental differences 
between these two clusters, despite the fact that they share some integral features. 
The significance of these differences bears out most importantly in cases where 
people decide to subject their own bodies to the market, by making their body 
available to others for money. This is where the boundary between inanimate 
objects and bodies can blur in the ways both bodies and objects are treated as 
commodities. Gaining greater clarity on the relevant notion of autonomy that 
underpins  bodily  ownership  will  provide  guidance  on  how  these  transactions 
should be treated under law.  
 
  Second, by working through examples, I suggested that we lose track of 
certain wrongs, including very serious ones, if we treat the body exactly like a 
piece of property. This happens when we try to model bodily transactions on the 
very same principles as property transactions such as rental, and draw out the 
implications of this in cases of breach of contract. Furthermore, the point at which 
we  lost  track  of  those  wrongs  in  the  examples  shed  some  light  on  a  core 
dissimilarity between the clusters of property ownership and bodily ownership. 
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taken to involve the owner of the body alienating control of her claims, powers 
and privileges over her body to somebody else. In contrast, no parallel problem 
arose in the case of a property owner alienating this power over an object such as 
her car. This gave rise to the third claim, that the ownership clusters governing 
property  and  one’s  body  differ  most  significantly  in  respect  of  the  power  to 
alienate control of all claims, privileges and powers over the thing in question. 
The search for an explanation of what went wrong when the body was exchanged 
as property showed us something important about the way in which claims against 
Trespass function and become morally relevant – that was through the ‘owner’ of 
the body enacting the moral powers of consent or dissent to certain actions. It 
seems to be crucial to our concept of bodily ownership that we retain these powers 
of control over our body, but not so for Second Property.     
 
I left the previous chapter on a question, however, and that was what 
reasons there could be for denying a person the right to treat her body exactly as a 
piece of property by entering into agreements whereby the power of control over 
her  body  is  transferred  to  another  person.  So  far,  I  have  shown  that  these 
transactions risk turning out very badly for the person who rents her body. But 
what if a person is aware of all these risks beforehand, and nevertheless insists that 
she wishes to alienate power over her body in just this way? What reasons could 
there be for preventing her from doing so? This is the question I set out to answer 
in this chapter. I will approach the question from a political, rather than moral 
aspect. That is, I will not attempt to provide a full account of what wrong an agent 
commits,  if  any,  in  treating  her  own  body  this  way,  or  what  wrong  a  client 
commits, if any, in participating in such contracts where they are willingly offered 
(and where the interaction goes happily for both ‘owner’ and client). 
 
Instead, I will focus on the political question of what reasons there could 
be for the state to refuse to uphold agreements in which the body is treated exactly 
as property in this way. A person who is aware of all the risks and wishes to use 
her body in this way might complain if she is barred from doing so on the grounds   66 
that it is risky. Her complaint here would be of paternalism, that her freedom was 
being unjustly curtailed because it is ‘for her own good’. The challenge as I see it 
is to meet this objection by finding reasons on which a state could justify denying 
individuals  the  right  to  transfer  ownership  of  their  bodies  to  others.  More 
precisely,  this  will  involve  investigating  more  closely  the  link  between  body 
ownership and autonomy, in order to see what this tells us what we should take to 
be the relevant notion of autonomy from a liberal political point of view. The 
answer  I  will  suggest  is  that  the  decision  to  deny  individuals  this  right  is 
paternalistic,  but  that  this  decision  of  the  state’s  involves  a  minimal  kind  of 
paternalism that is bound up in the justification of the very purpose of the state in 
the first place. 
 
This way of framing the role of legitimate political authority also further 
cements the distinction between bodily and property ownership. I suggest that the 
need  for  an  institution  of  property  rights  arises  from  the  very  same  basic 
assumptions about our interests that ground bodily rights. However, the nature of 
property  and  its  relation  to  our  agency  is  such  that  the  cluster  of  property 
ownership is far more flexible than the core cluster of bodily rights. As illustrated 
with the example of restrictions on the use of listed buildings, there are many 
forms that a legitimate institution of property could take, though it is necessary 
that there be some configuration of property rights under law to determine rules for 
acquisition, transfer and alienation of property. In short, we can understand the 
role  of  liberal  political  authority  as  stemming  from  a  need  to  ensure  that  the 
power  of  individuals  to  enforce  certain  basic  claims,  privileges  and  powers  as 
regard their bodies is protected. Establishing the core cluster of bodily rights is the 
first step here, and the need for property arises as a secondary aspect to this. In 
this sense, Thomson’s terms ‘First Property’ and ‘Second Property’34 are again 
particularly apt – the requirement for a core of bodily self-ownership comes prior 
to the subsequent question of what else we can and need to own, and what shape 
that ownership will take. 
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I. THE PARALLEL GROUNDING OF BODILY AND PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
 
It will be useful to begin with a recap of the main similarities between 
bodily ownership and property ownership. As I suggested in chapter two through 
the comparison of fingernails and pencil cases, it seems to be a basic feature of 
owning something that one has the power and privilege to decide what happens to 
it,  in  particular  when  it  comes  to  the  question  of  others  using  the  object  in 
question. So when you own something, this places limits on what others may do 
with that piece of property, and places them under an obligation not to interfere 
with your property (which you as the owner can waive). If we value individual 
freedom, it is clear why it would be important for individuals to be attributed 
these powers over their own bodies. For as we saw in the preceding discussion of 
Thomson’s  account  of  Trespass  claims,  if  we  lacked  claims  against  bodily 
interference from others, then our ability to enact our agency would be under 
constant threat. So it seems that if we care about having a choice in what we do, 
then we must care about having this kind of power of control over our bodies, and 
claims against others that they not interfere with our bodies. Put very roughly, we 
want to have this kind of control over our bodies so that we can do the things we 
want to do. After all, being the embodied beings that we are, there is only a very 
limited range of pastimes one could engage in if one lacked control of one’s own 
body or any assurance that others would respect one’s exclusive claims to control 
that body. 
 
If we now consider the reasons we value having ownership over property, 
they boil down to very much the same thing. This is most clearly seen for the most 
basic forms of property – food, shelter, warm clothes – the essential purpose of 
which is to protect our bodies from the elements and ensure we can survive, to 
carry on doing whatever it is we want to do with our bodies. But beyond this, the 
value of even relatively frivolous items of property such as the pannier bag I attach 
to my bicycle can be explained in the same way. My pannier bag enables me to do 
some of the things I want to do, like carrying my books as I cycle to campus, and   68 
part of it being my property means that I have some assurance that others will not 
snatch it off my bicycle when I’m stopped at traffic lights, preventing me from 
getting my books to campus. Having the power to use certain items in the world, 
and holding claims against others that they not interfere with those items thus in a 
way extends a person’s secured sphere of agency. 
 
The idea of property rights paralleling bodily rights in this way is apparent 
in Kantian literature, where the emphasis is on the importance of the entitlement 
to set one’s own ends, and the roles that bodily rights and property rights play in 
this. Arthur Ripstein sums this up as follows: 
 
“Your  body  is  your  person,  and  it  constrains  others  because  it  is  that 
through which you act, your capacity to set and pursue purposes, and any 
interference with your body interferes with that capacity. Your property 
constrains others because it comprises the external means that you use in 
setting and pursuing purposes; if someone interferes with your property, he 
thereby interferes with your purposiveness.”35 
 
“Your basic right to your property is the right that you be the one who 
determines how it will be used.”36 
 
I do not intend to follow an entirely Kantian account of bodily rights and property 
rights, partly because I do not want to commit to any metaphysical claim as to 
whether the body simply is the person. Part of the motivation for embarking on 
this analysis and framing it in terms of a comparison between bodily ownership 
and property ownership is the fact that we can and sometimes do treat our bodies 
as though they are separate entities which can be alienated in the same way that 
property can. On the question of alienation, Ripstein says the following: 
 
“Your rights to property thus parallel your right to your own person, but 
because property is something that exists in a different location from you, 
your right to it can be violated when you are not in possession of it, and 
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further, because it is separate, you can alienate it, either by abandoning it 
or by transferring it to another person via contract.”37 
 
This is not so much an explanation of why property is alienable while the body is 
not  rather  than  a  statement  of  fact  that  property  is  separate  from  you.  The 
reasoning seems to be that you are your body, followed by the assumption that 
you  cannot  alienate  yourself.  Property  being  separate  from  you,  however,  is 
alienable because separate.  
 
  But why should we accept this simple story? We saw in the previous chapter 
that there was a sense in which Alice could treat her body as though it were 
alienable  from  herself,  in  the  sense  of  transferring  the  power  of  control  of  all 
claims, privileges and powers over her body to Oliver. This mirrored the way in 
which a piece of property can be alienated. The comparison was perhaps closest 
when we stipulated that Alice was unconscious during the period of alienation. In 
this case, just like a piece of property that goes out of one’s sight, Alice would not 
be aware of what was happening to her body during that time, and would have no 
way of exerting her control over it. But Alice could also treat her body this way 
while fully conscious, if we understood the transaction as involving the alienation 
of those claims to control. So if it is possible to treat our bodies as alienable in this 
way,  we  should  offer  some  explanation  as  to  why  this  should  not  be  allowed 
beyond the bare claim that your body simply is your person. 
 
  The above reservations notwithstanding, this Kantian view is useful to bear 
in mind the core similarity that our basic interest in owning property is grounded 
in the same way as our basic interest in having exclusive use and power over our 
own bodies, and that is to be able to make free choices as to how to use our bodies 
and our things without interference from others. Furthermore, having such claims 
over our bodies is prior to having such claims over property, because as we saw in 
the previous chapter, if I lacked such claims over my body, then all anybody 
would need to do to take my shoes would be to kill me.  
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  So where does this get us? Well, we can see that if we value individual 
freedom, then we will want to have these basic claims to our bodies protected, and 
we  will  also  want  some  way  of  coming  to  own  property  and  securing  that 
ownership so that we can do various things that require using things other than 
our  own  bodies.  Furthermore,  having  more  property  will  enlarge  a  person’s 
sphere of agency in terms of increasing the range of possible actions available to 
her. If I own a boat, I will be entitled to go boating on the public waterways on a 
sunny summer’s day. If I don’t own a boat, I will have no such entitlement.  We 
could well frame a desire to acquire more property as driven by an inclination to 
gain more freedom, in this sense of increasing the number of actions that I am 
entitled to decide to take.  
 
  Suppose Alice really wants a boat, but she doesn’t have the money to buy 
one. Alice’s desire for the boat is particularly urgent, and she decides that there 
are two best options available to her to get the cash together to buy it. They both 
involve Oliver.  The first option is to have sex with Oliver for money, on the 
model  of  a  service-contract,  where  specific  performance  cannot  be  enforced. 
Oliver has agreed to pay 70% of the boat’s value for this service. The second 
option is to rent her body to Oliver on exactly the same principles as the car 
rental, where she alienates control of all claims, privileges and powers over her 
body to him, perhaps in exchange for his word that he will only use them in 
certain  ways.  Oliver  has  agreed  to  pay  100%  of  the  boat’s  value  for  this 
transaction. I have said that having a basic cluster of ownership claims over my 
body is prior to being able to have property claims. Alice’s property claims rest on 
shaky ground if she has no guarantee of the safety of her body, which is after all 
what she uses to control her property. So it would probably be a bad idea to sell 
her body in order to get some more property. But it is not immediately obvious 
why  short-term  transactions  on  the  body-rental  model  carried  out  in  order  to 
secure more property would be such a bad choice. In Alice’s case, this choice 
seems to be motivated for a desire to increase her sphere of freedom. Although the   71 
body-rental transaction involves relinquishing some freedom of control over her 
body for a short time, this is done for the sake of widening her sphere of freedom 
in the long term. On the face of it, it looks comparable to the idea of investing a 
sum of money into something in order to get bigger returns in the future. We 
normally take this to be a rational decision involving a judgement of risk and 
reward. So if we start from the assumption that we value freedom and ground 
some basic bodily ownership claims on this basis, with property ownership arising 
as an extension from this, what goes wrong if an individual like Alice seeks to 
alienate some of her basic bodily ownership claims in return for gaining greater 
freedom through having more property? And would we be wrong to stop her from 
doing so? 
 
 
II. BODY OWNERSHIP, AUTONOMY, AND LIBERAL AUTHORITY   
 
This is where the question of the nature of political justification becomes most 
relevant. The reason to start at the very beginning of the story of state legitimacy 
is twofold. First, we are not concerned with merely private agreements between 
individuals but rather with transactions involving at least two parties agreeing to 
bind  themselves  to  certain  conditions.  In  the  kinds  of  cases  that  we’re  most 
concerned with, where a person wishes to enter an agreement to rent her body 
out on the same terms as a piece of property, we can see how the state might get 
involved  as  arbitrator  even  if  no  formal  written  contract  were  involved.  This 
would happen in cases of breach like the one discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
  There, Alice ‘rented’ her body to Oliver on the agreement that he may 
have sex with it for half an hour. Alice then changed her mind shortly after the 
interaction had begun, but Oliver carried on regardless, as per the terms of their 
original agreement. If Alice were to press charges against Oliver for rape, Oliver 
might well plead in his defence that Alice had delegated powers of control of the 
relevant claims over her body to him, and so he did no wrong in carrying on using 
those powers in the way they had previously agreed he would. In such a case, the   72 
state judiciary would be faced with a decision – it can either uphold agreements of 
the body renting type and judge that Oliver has done no wrong, or it can refuse to 
acknowledge the initial agreement as valid, thus refusing to sanction the right of 
individuals  to  alienate  power  over  their  bodies  in  this  way.  In  refusing  to 
acknowledge the alienation of bodily powers, the state would recognise Alice’s on-
going claim against bodily interference. It would judge that consent for a certain 
act had been given by Alice at the outset of the interaction, thus waiving her claim 
against Oliver that he not interfere with her body in that way. But when she 
changed her mind and dissented, she reinstated her claim against Oliver that he 
not interfere with her body. It is this power to dissent that would not be attributed 
to Alice if the transaction were taken to involve a delegation of her powers over 
her body to Oliver on the model of renting a piece of property. 
 
  We are back to the question here of whether bodily self-ownership includes 
the right to transfer ownership powers over the body to another person, but more 
precisely whether the state should attribute such transfer rights to individuals if its 
primary concern is to preserve individual freedom. At the extreme libertarian end 
of  the  scale,  Robert  Nozick38 argued  that  full  ownership  rights  must  include 
transfer rights, and so full self-ownership must include the right to transfer this 
ownership to somebody else. Any restriction on this would, for Nozick, count as a 
restriction on the freedom of the self-owning individual. The assertion that full 
freedom requires individuals to be able to choose to become a slave is puzzling, 
and appears contradictory to some liberals (to be discussed below). The question 
turns upon the view of autonomy one takes – whether the state must protect the 
having of effective autonomy or the exercise of autonomy39. So we see again that a 
full understanding of the extent and operation of the powers involved in bodily 
self-ownership will rest on a relevant understanding of autonomy. I suggest that 
we can hone in on the relevant notion of autonomy by taking a closer look at the 
form of the justification for state authority in social contract theory.   
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  The reason for going back to the story of the hypothetical beginnings of the 
state is that it starts with the same assumption that we found lay at the heart of the 
need  for  a  basic  cluster  of  bodily  ownership  claims  and  subsequent  property 
ownership claims. That is that there is an assumption of the value of the free 
choice of the individual which underpins the justification for the very existence of 
a  state  authority,  and  further  informs  us  as  to  what  shape  the  institutions 
established by that authority can take.  
 
  The first step here is to understand the problem that social contract theories 
seek to solve. In the most basic terms, the common starting point seems to be this: 
in the state of nature, people are free to act as they like, with no laws or coercive 
power  placing  constraints  on  what  they  are  allowed  to  do.  Lacking  any  such 
constraints on people’s actions, however, makes living in the state of nature fairly 
dangerous, as there are no assurances against others interfering with either your 
body or the things you want to claim possession of. Each person must rely on her 
own brute force to protect her own person and any things she wishes to retain 
control over in the state of nature. From here, theorists hypothesise that given the 
option,  rational  people  in  this  precarious  state  would  make  the  free  choice  to 
implement some system of governance whereby laws are agreed upon, and some 
body  of  authority  is  given  coercive  power  to  enforce  these  laws  and  ensure 
everybody abides by them. But to see this as merely a trade-off between liberty 
and safety, with one of these values losing out to the other, is too simplistic. For 
Rousseau, for example, the challenge was to find a solution to achieve security 
without any loss of freedom: 
 
“’The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and 
protect  with  the  whole  common  force  the  person  and  goods  of  each 
associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey 
himself alone, and remain as free as before.’ This is the fundamental 
problem of which the social contract provides the solution.”40 
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Why think, as Rousseau did, that full freedom of the individual must be 
preserved at all costs, and how could this possibly be achieved? Isn’t it enough to 
conceive of the choice between liberty and safety as a necessary trade-off, and 
then hypothesise the weighting that rational individuals would give to each of 
these values? It is important to bear in mind the form of the justification given 
here. The argument does not move from the fact that there is or was a necessary 
choice to be made between competing systems, to the conclusion that the one 
chosen is justified as the best (or least bad) among all possible alternatives. Rather, 
the purpose of the hypothetical choice model is to indicate that rational agents, 
given the freedom to choose, would opt for certain forms of government over 
others, and it is those forms of government that could be rationally chosen which 
are considered justified on the very grounds that they have the possibility of being 
chosen. So the value in the free choice grounds the value and legitimacy of what 
can be chosen. If we start by identifying free choice as the criterion by which 
coercive authority can be justified, and build up from there, then we can see that 
there would be something oddly self-defeating in ending up with a system that 
failed to preserve this free choice of individuals. If the possibility of free choice is 
our basic criterion for justifying authority, and from this we end up justifying an 
authority that diminishes the power of free choice, then we may well wonder why 
we  cared  about  free  choice  so  much  in  the  first  place.  Such  a  system  of 
justification would be pragmatically self-defeating41.  
 
  So there we have an answer as to why the solution to the state of nature 
problem should be to find a form of government that protects individuals while 
leaving them as free as they were before. But it is still mysterious as to how this 
can be done. After all, the mechanism by which safety is ensured will presumably 
be a coercive one setting some rules by which individuals must abide, and either 
forcibly preventing individuals from breaking those rules, or punishing them when 
they do so. In what sense, then, could any system of government that preserves the 
safety of its subjects also preserve the full freedom of each? The answer, I believe, 
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lies in a certain conception of what the core freedom of the individual consists in, 
and  this  is  where  the  theory  links  back  to  our  original  question.  Instead  of 
embarking on a full-blown analysis of how the state preserves this freedom of the 
individual, I believe we can learn something significant from investigating what 
reasons there are to prevent an individual from alienating her claims over her 
body as if it were a piece of property she owned.  
 
  As we saw, if Alice wants to temporarily alienate her body in order to 
enlarge  her  sphere  of  freedom  by  gaining  more  property,  then  an  immediate 
answer  might  be  that  any  restriction  on  Alice’s  ability  to  do  this  would  be  a 
restriction on her freedom. Such restrictive state action would look suspect on the 
model of justification above. But then again, if the state upholds her ability to do 
so, and Alice subsequently changes her mind about the terms of the alienation, the 
state will then be restricting her free choice to decide what happens to her body 
during the contractual period. We seem to find ourselves in a bit of a bind – 
whichever option the state takes as regards these contracts, it will be committed to 
restricting Alice’s free choice under some conditions. So which matters more? Is it 
Alice’s ability to exercise a free choice to alienate her body, or is it the security to 
have on-going power of free choice over her body protected by the state?  
 
This is of course the form of the dilemma that underlies the puzzle of 
voluntary slavery. As mentioned above, Nozick sees nothing particularly puzzling 
in this choice, as he takes it to be an instance of an individual exercising a free 
choice with regard to something he has full and exclusive ownership powers over. 
But other liberal heavyweights, including Rousseau and Mill, purport to find a 
contradiction inherent in this ‘choice’. On this, Mill says: 
 
“But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any 
future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own 
case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose 
of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has 
no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his 
voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that   76 
he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate 
his freedom.”42 
   
Rousseau, on similar lines, declares: 
 
“Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the 
one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it 
not clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we 
have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the 
absence  of  equivalence  or  exchange,  in  itself  involve  the  nullity  of  the 
act?”43 
 
It is fairly difficult to decipher the exact shape and force of the argument in each 
of these passages, not least because both Mill and Rousseau respectively take the 
point they are making to be “apparent” and “clear”. Mill especially appears to 
think  there  is  a  straight  contradiction  in  an  individual  using  his  freedom  to 
alienate his freedom of choice. However, as we have seen with Alice, there are 
ways of conceiving of such a choice that make rational sense, especially when 
done on the grounds of gaining greater freedom in the long run through having a 
greater share of material goods. So what reasons are there actually for refusing 
individuals this choice?   
 
If we start from the beginnings of social contract theory again, we can 
construct a form of justification for refusing to uphold this choice of the individual, 
which  does  not  rely  on  declaring  the  choice  contradictory,  but  nevertheless 
captures something that both Mill and Rousseau were concerned with. Recall that 
the state of nature hypothesis began by attributing to individuals a basic interest in 
having the power to make a free choice. There is a recognition that the power of 
individuals to make free choices is under constant threat from others in the state of 
nature. So from here arises the hypothesis of a system that can be freely chosen 
that  implements  security  in  order  to  protect  the  freedom  of  individuals,  while 
crucially leaving individuals as free as they were before.  
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From the point of view of the state, the options for dealing with body-
rental  or  slavery  contracts  are  as  follows.  The  first  option  is  to  commit  to 
upholding  the  individual’s  right  to  enter  into  such  agreements,  thereby 
committing  itself  to  overriding  the  complaints  of  the  voluntary  slave  or  body-
renter who changes her mind during the contractual period. The second option is 
to refuse to uphold the initial contract, and commit to providing protection from 
unwanted bodily interference for Alice or the voluntary slave, should either of 
them object to what is being done to them, regardless of what might have been 
agreed beforehand. If we refer back to the form of justification explored above, we 
now have a criterion by which to choose between these two options. The original 
problem was to find a way of securing both the safety and freedom of individuals, 
and the state is supposed to provide the solution to that problem. So we can ask 
which decision allows the state to best preserve the safety and freedom of the 
individual concerned in this case.  
 
This can be drawn out most clearly if we recall that this is best conceived 
as  a  question  of  enforcement  of  an  agreement.  Enforcement  of  a  body-selling 
contract  in  the  case  of  owner-breach  such  as  Alice’s  means  leaving  Alice 
unprotected from rape when she changes her mind about having sex with Oliver. 
This is because under the terms of the contract, Oliver would be considered as 
using Alice’s body under terms she had agreed to, and so there would be no threat 
of punishment for Oliver for proceeding as per those terms.  In that instance, 
Alice loses the guarantee of protection of her powers of control over her own body 
normally accorded to her under the law of the state. The result of this is that she is 
left in danger of something very bad happening to her – namely that Oliver has 
sex with her against her will. For the duration of the contractual period then, in 
relation to Oliver and that act, Alice finds herself back in a similar state as she 
would be in the state of nature, with no guarantee beyond her own brute force 
that another person will not interfere with her body in a way she objects to.  
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The alternative is for the state to refuse to uphold the contract, and to 
make it clear that Alice’s power of control over what happens to her body will be 
upheld regardless of anything she might have agreed beforehand. This prevents 
Alice from the precarious situation described above, thus better protecting her 
from danger, but it does so at the cost of denying her the free choice to be bound 
to the contract in the first place.  However, we should notice that this is not a 
choice that Alice would be able to make in the state of nature. That is because 
contracts require recognition and enforcement of the contractual terms by some 
authority. Without state enforcement, such agreements would be no more than 
personal pledges between two people without any assurance that either would 
keep their word. It is part of the value of the contract, and part of the reason why 
Alice might be able to procure a higher price for specifically renting her body in 
this way, that there is this assurance that both parties will be bound to the terms of 
the agreement by the enforcement of some authority. So if the state refuses to 
recognise such agreements as valid, it does not deny Alice any free choice that she 
would have otherwise had.  
 
Comparing the two options in this way allows us to see which can best be 
justified if we view the purpose of the state to solve the problem of how to secure 
both the safety and freedom of individuals. Enforcing such contracts will leave an 
individual in a situation in which they are both open to significant danger and lack 
the power to make free choices as to what happens to their bodies for a certain 
period of time. Refusing to enforce those contracts will not restrict the sphere of 
choices  that  the  individual  would  have  had  in  the  state  of  nature,  and  it  will 
preserve  the  individual’s  on-going  safety  and  freedom  of  choice  as  concerns 
interference with her body by others. It seems then that if we take seriously a form 
of justification of the legitimacy of state authority that is based on finding value in 
the  free  choice  of  the  individual,  and  arises  from  a  fundamental  concern  for 
preserving this freedom of individuals by securing their safety, then one of the 
consequences will be that a legitimate state authority will not sanction transactions 
in which one individual relinquishes power of control over her body to another,   79 
because it will not recognise the terms of these agreements when called upon to 
enforce them by one of the parties involved in the agreement. 
 
Furthermore,  this  conclusion  again  puts  the  spotlight  on  what  kind  of 
claims,  privileges  and  powers  are  fundamental  to  the  core  of  bodily  self-
ownership,  and  the  way  in  which  these  ownership  powers  operate.  If  state 
authority is justified by its role in securing the conditions under which individuals 
can retain their freedom without the threat of unwanted interference from others, 
then a minimum requirement for such conditions will be that the state protects the 
claims, powers, and privilege of each individual to prevent others from interfering 
with her body in ways she objects to. Part of this will involve always attributing to 
individuals the moral powers to consent or dissent to acts that interfere with their 
bodies, and defining offences of Trespass in relation to the autonomous operation 
of these powers. This, I suggest, is a crucial aspect of how we should understand 
autonomy,  whether  we  are  talking  about  individual  autonomy  in  general,  or 
particular terms like ‘sexual autonomy’. I take it that to specify sexual autonomy is 
merely  to  emphasise  the  way  in  which  individuals  have  this  relevant  kind  of 
autonomous  power  over  acts  done  to  or  with  their  body  that  are  of  a  sexual 
nature. It does not pick out a sphere of autonomy that is different in kind to the 
general term ‘autonomy’.  
 
If we accept the above, we can justify an authority’s decision to refuse to 
uphold agreements like voluntary slavery or body-selling contracts which involve 
an agent alienating his power over his own body to another, on the grounds that 
upholding such contracts would be a failure of the authority to fulfil its primary 
role of securing conditions of safety and autonomy for each individual. And from 
the  form  of  justification  discussed  above,  the  individual  has  no  claim  on  that 
authority that it should take positive action to widen the individual’s sphere of 
choices beyond the core cluster of bodily ownership claims by committing itself to 
enforcing such contracts. Given that the reasons adduced for considering all such 
contracts null and void rely on a basic concern for the safety and freedom of the   80 
individual concerned, we might well call this ruling paternalistic. But if it is, this is 
a non-problematic form of paternalism, as we see that state authority is justified 
from  the  very  beginning  of  the  story,  precisely  because  the  need  for  a  state 
authority  arises  from  the  grounding  assumption  that  individuals  have  a  basic 
interest in being protected in this way.  
 
Having  clarified  this  relevant  notion  of  autonomy  from  the  political 
perspective, this can again help to clarify a key difference between ownership of 
objects,  as  opposed  to  bodies.  We  saw  above  that  both  bodily  and  property 
ownership share a common grounding in our status as autonomous beings, and 
our need to be able to enact our autonomy in a world populated by others. We 
found reasons in social contract theory to defend a liberal view on which part of 
the role of state authority is to ensure that each individual retains power over their 
bodily  ownership  claims,  in  terms  of  determining  the  permissibility  of  others 
interfering with his own body. In chapter two, it was also suggested (via Kant) that 
a requirement for an institution of property arises out of a necessity for individuals 
to be able to enact their autonomous nature in a way that is compatible with the 
full  and  equal  freedom  of  all.  There  was  a  suggestion  there  that  due  to  the 
institutional grounding of these kinds of property rights, the way in which clusters 
of property ownership of things can be determined is ‘up for grabs’ in a way that 
the cluster of bodily ownership is not. We can now see more clearly why this is, 
and it lies in the different relations between First and Second Property and our 
very ability to enact our autonomy. Relinquishing ownership powers over any one 
piece of Second Property does not affect the individual’s core powers to control 
what does and does not happen to him and his body. It does not eliminate the 
individual’s  power  to  dissent  to  all  future  unwanted  interference  and  thereby 
threaten his safety in the same way that selling himself, or his body, into slavery 
would. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis began with an analysis of prostitution, in an attempt to identify and 
explore some of the main philosophical problems that it poses. It was suggested 
that there is something in the nature of both sex and money that distinguishes 
prostitution from other bodily services in the potential it has for the transaction to 
be characterised as an exchange of the body as property, rather than a service 
carried out by a person with the use of her body. On the other hand, there is 
nothing inherent in the activity that precludes it from being characterised and 
carried out as a service like any other. Prostitution, it was claimed, thus inhabits a 
grey  area  between  property  exchange  and  bodily  service,  prompting  us  to 
investigate  what  kind  of  ownership  we  can  have  over  our  bodies,  through  an 
analysis of where bodily rights and property rights overlap, and where they come 
apart.  This  was  undertaken  in  chapter  two,  which  in  particular  explored  the 
implications of attempting to ‘rent’ one’s body as one might rent out a car, in 
order to tease out the different ways in which one can forfeit claims to property 
and claims to control of one’s body. There, I identified a key difference between 
the way in which property ownership and bodily ownership claims can be waived, 
and suggested that retaining on-going powers of consent and dissent over what 
happens to our bodies is crucially linked to our moral status in a way that is not 
the case for property.  
 
But this left us with a question – if an agent makes an autonomous choice 
to alienate some of her bodily claims in the same way that she could alienate 
claims over a piece of property, what reasons could there be from a liberal point 
of view to justify preventing her from doing so, if she is aware this threatens her 
moral status and puts her at risk of harm? Chapter three sought to answer this 
question  by  investigating  more  closely  the  relation  between  ownership  and 
autonomy, and identifying the relevant notion of autonomy which a liberal state’s 
authority consists in protecting. This, in turn, helped to clarify the limits of bodily 
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allowed to transfer to other people. Transfer rights are thus not included in the 
kind  of  ownership  we  have  over  our  own  bodies,  and  the  relevant  notion  of 
autonomy that a liberal state must protect is that individuals must retain powers of 
control over their own bodies, including the ability to operate the moral powers of 
consent and dissent to determine which actions may permissibly be carried out to 
or with their bodies.  
 
The point of these theoretical investigations, which at points may have 
seemed at a remove from the original actual activity of prostitution, was to gain a 
better sense of the core philosophical puzzles buried at the heart of the activity. 
On reflection, it seems there is something special about sex that yields reasons to 
worry  about  the  potential  threat  it  poses  to  autonomy  when  one  person  pays 
another for sex. This lies in the paradoxical tendency of sexual desire to treat the 
bodies specifically of persons as mere objects for the satisfaction of that desire, and 
the way in which this tendency is amplified by expectations about what powers 
are gained over such objects by exchanging money for sex. For this reason, there 
is a threat inherent in prostitution that the bodies of sex workers be treated as 
objects to be transacted with as property. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go 
on to decide exactly what the appropriate legislative response to this problem 
would be, but it provides a more robust theoretical basis from which to consider 
such questions of policy-making. I will close here with a few suggestions of the 
direction this may take.  
 
Given the nature of the problem identified, it would be easy to point out 
that under current UK law, the body is not considered property that can be owned 
and transferred in the same sense as other objects. But this in itself does not make 
the problem obsolete. For the threat posed in prostitution is not simply a matter of 
whether prostitution transactions can in fact be carried out and recognised under 
law  as  property  transactions  involving  the  body,  but  rather  a  matter  of  the 
attitudes of each party involved, and the extent to which the sex worker becomes 
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transaction. It would seem plausible to suggest that this tendency is influenced by 
informal market norms and expectations around this bodily trade.  
 
It seems clear that where regulation of prostitution is minimal at most, 
there is wide scope for market norms to dictate certain unwritten rules for the 
transaction which may not be recognised in law as valid contractual terms, but 
which can nevertheless influence the shape of transactions without ever facing 
legal  challenge.  Market  norms  can  thus  undermine  the  autonomy  of  those 
involved in the trade in the relevant sense, by weakening their power to retain 
control over their bodily claims, and making it less likely that these be properly 
enforced. This in turn opens the door to a great deal of potential harm. The 
harm, however, is in a sense a secondary problem. For it is the initial undermining 
of autonomy in the relevant sense with which a legitimate state authority should 
be  concerned.  It  is  this  autonomous  exercise  of  bodily  ownership  claims  that 
allows  an  individual  to  determine  what  acts  of  bodily  interference  and  harm 
become a concern of the authority in the first place. 
 
There  are  several  factors  we  can  pick  out  as  feeding  into  market 
expectations,  and  creating  market  norms  that  may  designate  prostitution 
transactions as ones involving the alienation of powers over the sex worker’s body 
in this autonomy-undermining way. The first two were suggested in chapter one, 
namely the wider meaning of money and its implications for the powers a client 
can buy with it. Second was the somewhat paradoxical nature of sexual desire, 
which on the one hand has a tendency towards strong objectification in viewing 
the body of the other as a thing to be consumed by the sexual appetite, but on the 
other hand, at least in prostitution, insists that its object must be the body of 
another – the very thing by which that person enacts her autonomous personality 
in the world. Other factors could be added to the list as well, such as a wider 
culture of men’s entitlement to women’s bodies, social expectations that women 
be subservient to men’s desires, low conviction rates for rape and sexual assault 
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misconceptions about what constitutes sexual assault or rape. We could add to this 
list  wider  attitudes  towards  prostitution  that  lead  to  the  marginalisation  and 
shaming of sex workers, and the fact that many sex workers are from poor socio-
economic backgrounds, with very few other options for stable work available to 
them44. 
Apart  from  the  point  about  sexual  desire,  these  are  all  contingent 
empirical claims about the way things are now, with some being more open to 
change than others45. The point of raising these, however, is not to argue simply 
that prostitution would be fine in itself if we lived in some ideal society without 
these  shortcomings,  and  it  is  merely  as  a  result  of  these  social  factors  that 
prostitution  becomes  problematic.  Rather,  as  I  suggested  in  chapter  one, 
prostitution by its nature already has the potential to be characterised as the kind 
of  transaction  that  involves  trading  in  the  body  on  the  model  of  a  property 
exchange, and this in itself raises certain deep problems and challenges to notions 
of autonomy, bodily ownership, and the ways in which we can interact with others 
and grant them access to or powers over our bodies. This was presented as an 
indeterminacy – that in the absence of other factors such as regulation to stipulate 
which  model  of  transaction  prostitution  must  be  carried  out  on,  it  would  be 
indeterminate how prostitution as an activity is characterised, and open to being 
carried out on either model in each individual case, depending mainly on the 
attitudes of the participants to the encounter.  Wider socio-economic background 
conditions are relevant insofar as they contribute to weighting the probability of 
the transaction being carried out in either of these two ways. The factors listed 
                                                 
44 Although in theory the problem inherent in prostitution is gender-neutral, it seems that 
this  comes  out  as  a  gendered  problem  once  the  background  social  conditions  are  taken  into 
account. These are such that the weighting of balance in favour of the transaction coming out as 
body-selling is influenced most greatly by gender issues – namely those which pertain to the status 
of women in society, and the skewed power balance in which men, in general, hold power over 
women.  That  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  transactions  involving  male  sex  workers  would  be 
immune to this problem. It is still plausible that given the relevant attitudes, a male sex worker 
could engage in a transaction in which his powers over his body are alienated to the client in the 
same way, whether the client be male or female.  
 
45 It should also be noted that the analysis of the meaning of money falls under the category of 
contingent empirical factor, though it ought to be distinguished from other factors such as the 
wider social attitudes towards women and women’s bodies in that it is in itself morally neutral.    85 
above are just some of those that may contribute to increasing the probability that 
the parties involved in prostitution will view the transaction as one of body-selling, 
but the list should be taken as suggestive, and certainly not exhaustive.  
 
Having  a  better  handle  on  the  way  in  which  these  contingent  factors 
contribute to the problem of prostitution – by weighting the indeterminacy in 
favour of problematic, body-selling transactions – as well as clearer notion of the 
exact  concern  this  raises  for  a  liberal  authority  concerned  with  protecting 
autonomy, points towards what form a solution to this problem might take. The 
aim for legislation in this area would be to eradicate transactions of the body-
selling kind, and ensure that if prostitution does happen, it is carried out as a 
personal service where each party respects the autonomy and body-ownership 
claims of the other, and sex workers in particular feel secure in their right to 
operate  their  powers  of  consent  or  dissent  to  any  act  at  any  point  in  the 
transaction.  Given  that  the  inherent  tendency  in  prostitution  towards  this  is 
fuelled by background social conditions feeding into expectations about the form 
of  prostitution  transactions,  it  would  seem  that  legislation  would  have  to  be 
directed towards changing both these background social conditions and affecting 
the attitudes of those who participate in prostitution. Not only this, but it would 
also be important to ensure that the industry remain stable by not feeding back 
into problematic social attitudes towards gender and sex relations (in the words of 
Debra Satz, not becoming a ‘theatre of inequality’46).  
 
It  is  an  immensely  complex  question  whether  or  how  this  could  be 
achieved effectively, and not one which can be covered here. A suggestion of a 
potential  solution,  though,  might  be  found  in  a  surprising  source  –  back  to 
Herman’s  suggestion  that  it  might  be  worth  thinking  about  Kant  on  sex  and 
marriage47.  Kant finds a similar objectification problem in acting on sexual desire 
in  general  that  I  have  argued  becomes  relevantly  problematic  in  prostitution. 
Given that due to our nature, we cannot avoid engaging in sex, Kant argues that 
                                                 
46 Satz (2010) 
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we  need  an  institutional  solution  in  marriage  to  secure  a  public  identity  for 
husband and wife which ensures that when each acts on sexual desire, they do so 
within a formalized relationship in which each recognises the autonomous status 
and rights of the other. This thus blocks husband and wife from regarding the 
other  merely  as  an  object  subordinated  to  the  sexual  desire,  even  when  that 
tendency  is  still  present.  It  strikes  me  as  an  interesting  line  to  pursue,  to  see 
whether  we  might  find  a  similar  solution  for  legislation  of  prostitution  by 
implementing regulatory measures to secure publicly recognised identities for sex 
workers  that  work  in  a  similar  way,  by  securing  a  culture  in  which  the 
autonomous status of sex workers is recognised and taken as given in all situations. 
This, as I said, is beyond the scope of this thesis. But by clarifying the underlying 
problematic of prostitution, I hope to have provided some guidance as to the kinds 
of responses that are most appropriate to the problem of prostitution. 
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